


International Conference

RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE: A REASSESSMENT

04.09.2023-06.09.2023



UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN
JENNY ALONI HAUS (IBZ) AND L-BUILDING, Room L 3.204

Organizers:
Apl. Prof. Dr. Nikolay Milkov and Dr. Michele Vagnetti

Conference Program

Monday, September 4th

JENNY ALONI HAUS UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN

14:00-14:30 Introduction with an Address from the Rector of the Paderborn University Prof. Dr. Birgitt Riegraf

Chair: Sebastian Luft

14:30-15:15 Matthias Neugebauer (University of Zurich): „Der Anfang der Metaphysik ist nicht in ihr selbst, sondern in der Ethik.“ — Zur Ethik-Konzeption Hermann Lotzes

15:15-16:00 Charlotte Morel (École normale supérieure de Paris): Durchdringung der Metaphysik und Erkenntnistheorie der Naturwissenschaften beim jungen Lotze: von der medizinischen Dissertation zur ersten Metaphysik

Coffee break

Chair: Mark Textor

16:30-17:15 Nikolay Milkov (University of Paderborn): Why Lotze?

17:15-18:00 David Sullivan (Metropolitan State University of Denver): Lotze's Legacy: A Revisionary Reading of "The *Ideenwelt*"

Tuesday, September 5th

UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN L-BUILDING, Room L 3.204

Chair: Matthias Neugebauer

09:00-09:45 Michele Vagnetti (University of Paderborn/University of Florence): Lotze und Leibniz

09:45-10:30 Christian Krijnen (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam): Zur Neubewertung der Logik Hermann Lotzes: eine anfängliche Problemanzeige

Coffee Break

Chair: Mirja Hartimo

11:00-11:45 Sebastian Luft (University of Paderborn): Lotze and James: a (Somewhat) Neglected Line of Influence on Pragmatism

11:45-12:30 Arnaud Dewalque (University of Liège): Lotze and Ward on the Place of Mind in Nature

Lunch

Chair: Christian Krijnen

14:30-15:15 Karen Green (University of Melbourne): E. E. Constance Jones and Hermann Lotze

15:15-16:00 Mark Textor (King's College London): Self-Consciousness and Interest

Coffee Break

Chair: Arnaud Dewalque

16:30-17:15 Denis Seron (University of Liège): Lotze and Brentano on Psychology

17:15-18:00 Giulio M. Cavalli (University of Parma): From the Many to the One. Lotze's Influence on Green and Bradley

19:00 *Official Conference Dinner at Trattoria Il Postino Jühenplatz 1-3, 33098 Paderborn*

Wednesday, September 6th

UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN L-BUILDING, L 3.204

Chair: Denis Seron

09:00-09:45 Mirja Hartimo (University of Helsinki): Lotze, Platonism, and Husserl's Antipsychologism

09:45-10:30 Paola Cantù Testa (Aix-Marseille University): Lotze's Logical Theory of Definitions

Coffee Break

Chair: Nikolay Milkov

11:00-11:45 Dolf Rami (Ruhr University Bochum): Lotze on Existence and Existence Entailing Concepts

11:45-12:30 Kai Hauser (Technical University of Berlin): Lotze's *Logik* in the Light of Modern Developments in the Foundations of Mathematics

Lunch

Chair: Michele Vagnetti

14:30-15:15 Robin Rollinger (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic): Lotze's Philosophical System as a Prelude to Phenomenological Metaphysics

15:15-16:00 Jacinto Paez Bonifaci (Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago - Chile): Lotze's Doctrine of Knowledge between Logic and Metaphysics

Coffee Break

Chair: Charlotte Morel

16:15-17:00 Maik Niemeck (University of Marburg): Is Concern for Oneself Unconditional?

17:00-17:15 Closing Remarks of the Conference

ABSTRACTS/SUMMARIES

Matthias Neugebauer

(University of Zurich)

„Der Anfang der Metaphysik ist nicht in ihr selbst, sondern in der Ethik.“ — Zur Ethik-Konzeption Hermann Lotzes

«[D]er Anfang der Metaphysik ist nicht in ihr selbst, sondern in der Ethik.» — Dieser Satz steht am Ende der frühen Metaphysik Lotzes und in variiertes (und vielleicht abgeschwächter) Form auch am Ende seiner späten Metaphysik, in der Lotze immer noch der Meinung ist, dass er «in Dem, was sein soll, den Grund dessen sucht, was ist».

Beide Formulierungen weisen darauf hin, dass der Ethik ein grundlegender systemtheoretischer Platz in seinem Denken zukommt. Bekanntlich hat Lotze sein System und – eben ausgerechnet – die Ethik nicht vollenden können. Aber sein Werk ist voll von entsprechenden ethischen Überlegungen. Anhand der einschlägigen Ausführungen aus dem «Mikrokosmos» aus den «Grundzüge[n] der praktischen Philosophie» sowie aus seinem «Nachgelassene[n] Aufsatz über die Principien der Ethik» sollen die grossen Linien seiner Ethik vorgestellt, innerhalb des Gesamtwerks eingeordnet und auf ihre heutige Relevanz hin abgeklopft werden.

Charlotte Morel

(École normale supérieure de Paris)

Durchdringung der Metaphysik und Erkenntnistheorie der Naturwissenschaften beim jungen Lotze: von der medizinischen Dissertation zur ersten Metaphysik

Focusing on Lotze's early works (1838–1844) allows us to understand how closely his metaphysical and epistemological agendas were linked. Here I will emphasize the Kantian features of Lotze's early metaphysics (1841), especially from its second part dealing with the world of phenomena. As a consequence, could this work be described as Lotze's own proposal for establishing "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science"? I will show that the "transcendental forms of intuition," which stand as metaphysical categories in Lotze's early metaphysics, already formed the structure of his medical dissertation (1838). Furthermore, taking into account an unexpected expression linking the physiological concept of "irritability" and the "transcendental form", I will argue that there is a counterpart to the architectonic function that metaphysics exerts on natural science: the latter might also have a heuristic function for Lotze in order to trace back the metaphysical "presuppositions" of our knowledge.

Nikolay Milkov

(University of Paderborn)

Why Lotze?

Lotze is often interpreted as a philosopher of second or third order (Ferdinand Fellmann), or as a “late German Idealist” (Frederick Beiser) situated somewhere between the German Idealists and the Neo-Kantians. In this paper I present Lotze (not Trendelenburg: Klaus Christian Köhnke) as the “great unknown [*der grosse Unbekante*]” of the history of philosophy of the 19th century. I see Lotze’s philosophy as the source from which both analytic philosophy and phenomenology emerged. To paraphrase Michael Dummett’s metaphor, Lotze was that philosophical “Black Forest” (*Schwarzwald*) from which “Danube” and “Rhine”, aka analytic philosophy and phenomenology, started their course but following different directions. Lotze achieved this by introducing a new method that made philosophy more formal and also more precise.

David Sullivan

(Metropolitan State University of Denver)

Lotze's Legacy: A Revisionary Reading of "The Ideenwelt"

While important clusters of Lotzean influence in the history of philosophy can readily be identified and neatly stipulated – American (Royce, James, Dewey), English (Ward, Bradley, Bosanquet), and German (Husserl, Lask, Heidegger), to name only a few – the search for contemporary traces of Lotze's thought might seem utterly elusive. "Surely Lotze's peculiar presence faded quickly from the scene, especially after the numerous paroxysms of the first world war," the average person surmises.

But if Lotze really did influence Frege, and if "Frege's problems are therefore still our problems" (Dummett, 1991), then perhaps something did survive, albeit hidden from view and in a mostly subterranean fashion. This paper explores that possibility, further exploiting a gap that can be more fully exposed between what Lotze took himself to be doing and what he could be construed to have been doing (even though these unintended efforts and effects might have been repudiated by him).

Michele Vagnetti

(University of Paderborn/University of Florence)

Lotze und Leibniz

Philosophen wie Friedrich Überweg, Johann Eduard Erdmann, Richard Falckenberg, Eduard von Hartmann und andere spüren in Lotzes philosophischem System Ideen auf, die schon bei Leibniz vorhanden waren, wie die religiöse Grundfärbung der beiden Systemen, die Vereinigung der Teleologie mit dem Mechanismus, die Trennung der Welt der Tatsachen von der Welt der allgemeinen Wahrheiten, die beide wiederum in Gott wurzeln, die unausgedehnten beseelten Atome und die Ersetzung des Raumes durch eine intelligible Ordnung (Stumpf, 1918). Lotze selbst äußert sich in seinem Briefwechsel zu seinem Verhältnis zu Leibniz' Denken. In einem Brief an Ludwig Strümpell aus dem Jahre 1872 stellt Lotze fest, dass er sich innerlich mit Leibniz in keinem Verhältnis fühle, dass es aber Material gebe, das einen solchen Vergleich zulasse. Ziel meines Vortrags ist es, die Grundzüge der Leibniz-Interpretation des jungen Lotze in seinem frühen Aufsatz *Pensées d'un Idiote sur Descartes, Spinoza et Leibnitz* (1840–44) zu erfassen und zu sehen, ob diese Interpretation in Lotzes späterem Werk ein Echo findet.

Christian Krijnen

(Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

*Zur Neubewertung der Logik Hermann Lotzes: eine anfängliche
Problemanzeige*

Lotzes Philosophie wird hinsichtlich ihrer sachlichen Relevanz im Sinne einer unmittelbaren Anschlußfähigkeit für heutiges Philosophieren untersucht. Dazu rückt das prinzipientheoretische Profil der Philosophie Lotzes ins Zentrum. Näherhin wird deren Grunddisziplin, die Logik, traktiert, genauer besehen wiederum der Anfang dieses Werkes: die Lehre vom Denken. Auch diese kommt nur in ihrem anfänglichen Bestimmungsstück zur Sprache, denn schon die „Lehre vom Begriffe“ gibt wichtige Gesichtspunkte für eine Bewertung her. Zu diesem Zweck werden zunächst das bewußtseinstheoretische Profil der Logik Lotzes sowie dessen geltungsfunktionale Transformation in der späteren Transzendentalphilosophie diskutiert und beides sodann konfrontiert mit Hegels spekulativem Idealismus.

Sebastian Luft

(University of Paderborn)

Lotze and James: a (Somewhat) Neglected Line of Influence on Pragmatism

In this paper, I reassess the influence Lotze's thought has had on William James. As it turns out, James was an avid reader of Lotze's works. The latter's influence on James' thought is at times unacknowledged, but palpable in many areas of his thought, most noticeably his psychology, but also his philosophy and his shape of pragmatism. This paper will be a first gloss at this rather unknown figure in the history of the Pragmatism.

Arnaud Dewalque
(University of Liège)

Lotze and Ward on the Place of Mind in Nature

This paper addresses Lotze's influence on James Ward's panpsychism and discusses some difficulties of their views. Both Lotze and Ward endorse a strong version of panpsychism, namely *pure mentalism*, according to which the constituents of reality deceptively appear to be material while in fact they are purely mental. The first part of the paper presents Ward's own version of pure mentalism as an attempt to improve on Lotze's. The second part raises some difficulties for pure mentalism and sketches an alternative metaphysical view, on which mind and matter are both essentially distinct and essentially inseparable.

Karen Green

(University of Melbourne)

E. E. Constance Jones and Hermann Lotze

This paper turns away from the logical developments for which E. E. Constance Jones is best known, in order to examine the context of the translation of *Mikrokosmos*, that had been begun by Elizabeth Hamilton and that Jones completed. It explores the context of the translation and extent to which Lotze's views influenced Jones's more broadly metaphysical and ethical writings, as well as those of her teachers. Ward's debts to Lotze are discussed and it is argued that Jones's defense of Sidgwick's philosophy, which she calls, 'rational hedonism' is influenced by her reading of Lotze, for she interprets them both, rightly or wrongly, as engaged in a rather similar enterprise. This raises the question, was Sidgwick also influenced by Lotze? It is argued that, rather than being a direct influence, Lotze's account of ethics shared significant elements with trends already established in Britain and this helps to explain Lotze's popularity and illuminates the background which resulted in his major works being translated into English during the 1880s.

Mark Textor

(King's College London)

Self-consciousness and Interest

Lotze claimed that '[a]ny self-consciousness presupposes as a necessary condition an *immediate interest* which we take in that content which our train of thought designates as our own I [...]. (*Medicinische Psychologie*, 498). This non-epistemic view of self-consciousness is not obvious: what has self-consciousness to do with interest? In my talk I will clarify Lotze's view and assess his reasons for it.

Denis Seron

(University of Liège)

Lotze and Brentano on Psychology

In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* of 1874, Franz Brentano strongly criticizes Lotze for sticking to the Aristotelian view of psychology as a “theory of the soul”. He also disagrees with him on some key methodological issues. Most significantly, his analytical approach may seem hardly compatible with Lotze’s claim that mental relations, unlike physical ones, are essentially obscure. My suggestion in this paper is that, these differences notwithstanding, the two authors’ views on psychology share important similarities. After outlining some theses underlying Lotze’s psychology (occasionalism, psychophysical mechanism, panpsychism), I discuss a couple of unexpected convergences with Brentano’s views.

Giulio M. Cavalli
(University of Parma)

From the Many to the One. Lotze's Influence on Green and Bradley

Britain was the first foreign country in which Lotze's philosophy has been thoroughly received: the first translation of his 'greater' *Metaphysik* appeared there in 1884 and was edited by Green and his pupils. Because of his 'eclecticism', Lotze has been read by the British idealists in opposite ways: some have embraced his arguments for monism; others have instead invoked his pluralism against Hegelian monism; others have even criticised him from the very Hegelian standpoint.

In this paper I shall explore Lotze's influence on Green and Bradley, which has never been really deepened, despite being acknowledged by virtually any scholar in the field (not to mention both philosophers themselves). By focusing on logico-metaphysical notions such as 'contradiction', 'relation', and 'unity', I aim to show (i) why Green's 'relationism', although Lotzean in its being against 'atomism', is still different from Lotze's, and (ii) that Bradley draws his arguments for monism – and against both Herbart and Green – mainly from Lotze. What they have learnt from him is, respectively, that the world is a system of relations, and that thought can never grasp the essence of reality.

Mirja Hartimo

(University of Helsinki)

Lotze, Platonism, and Husserl's Antipsychologism

This paper is a part of a more general project in which I compare Frege and Husserl with respect of their attitudes toward logic, and in which I argue that whereas Frege's approach is paradigmatically "logic-first", Husserl's is a critical view of logic that does not take any particular logic for granted but calls for the kind of critique of logic that Kant demanded, not of logic, but of metaphysics, science and mathematics. This paper is based on a hypothesis that while for both Lotze is an important background figure, their diverging approaches to logic can be located in their antipsychologistic reactions to Lotze. On this occasion I will focus on how this happens in Husserl's approach in particular. While Husserl's phenomenology shares much with Lotze's *Logik*, Husserl explicitly disagreed with it in his suggestion to replace Lotze's view of Plato's doctrine of ideas with modern mathematics. In this talk, I will first briefly discuss similarities between Husserl's phenomenology and the views expressed in Lotze's *Logik*. Against this backdrop, I will examine Husserl's suggested transformation of *Ideenlehre*: what it shows about the nature of Husserl's anti-psychologism about logic, how it makes his view of logic "mathematics-first" (as opposed to Lotze's and Frege's approaches) and how this gives rise to his critical conception of logic.

Paola Cantù

(Aix-Marseille University)

Lotze's Logical Theory of Definitions

The paper discusses Hermann Lotze's contribution to definition theory, analyzing Lotze's *Logic* (1874), and especially the Theory of concepts, the section on inferences and systematic forms in the first volume, as well as the first chapter of the second volume. The main goal of the paper is to understand why logical definitions are first discussed after judgment theory and not within concept theory, and the peculiarity of Lotze's logical theory of definitions. The paper will first present Lotze's view on nominal and real definitions and the conditions that an adequate definition must meet, and then analyze how the classical definition by genus and species is combined with a hypothetical and lawful scientific treatment.

Dolf Rami

(Ruhr University Bochum)

Lotze on Existence and Existence Entailing Concepts

In this paper, I give a new interpretation of Lotze's conception of existence. I will show that his view is conceptually more closely related to the view of Descartes than to any other view. Furthermore, I will also give a brief review of Lotze's main arguments against the views of existence of Kant and Herbart. Apart from his view on existence, I will reconstruct his very original view on existence entailing concepts and his related critique of Descartes views on this topic.

Kai Hauser

(Technical University of Berlin)

Lotze's Logik in the Light of Modern Developments in the Foundations of Mathematics

I will compare specific elements of the *Logik* with contemporary viewpoints in the philosophy of mathematics about objectivity, truth, evidence and ultimate justification.

Robin Rollinger

(Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic)

Lotze's Philosophical System as a Prelude to Phenomenological Metaphysics

Jacinto Paez Bonifaci

(Diego Portales University, Santiago - Chile)

Lotze's Doctrine of Knowledge between Logic and Metaphysics

The purpose of the presentation is to show this divergence in the treatment of knowledge as it relates to metaphysics. As we know, Lotze revamped modern philosophy by creating a series of conceptual distinctions, normative and natural, validity and reality, and intentionality and existence. Through these innovative conceptual tools, Lotze established a primary philosophical agenda continued by neo-Kantians. However, this relevance of Lotze's position for neo-Kantians often obscures the fact that this position does not represent a given in Lotze's philosophy but a point of arrival. Lotze's key concept of validity, which is fully determined in his 1874's *Logic*, stands in a broader metaphysical context, which itself goes through different stages of development. With this statement in view, we will try to point out the similarities and differences in the treatment of the relation between logic and metaphysics in two versions of Lotze's system: in 1840 and in 1870.

Maik Niemeck

(University of Marburg)

Is Concern for Oneself Unconditional?

That most people take a special interest in themselves seems to be an undisputable fact. While there is considerable agreement in the current philosophical literature that there is such a thing as a unique concern for oneself, there are also significant differences in how the nature of this self-concern is understood. According to one view, concern for oneself is ultimately unconditional and non-instrumental. It is something that we entertain merely in virtue of the kinds of beings we are, regardless of how we otherwise think, desire or feel. In this talk, I aim to argue against such a position, before defending an instrumentalist view. I contend that we are the ultimate instruments for ourselves, and that even in those cases where we do not care about ourselves as an end, we still need to be concerned about us in virtue of all the other things we care about. This instrumental self-concern is not grounded in our nature as valuers or agents, but in our nature as vulnerable and limited beings that have to persist to realize their conative and affective states. Our permanently endangered existence and limited capacity to act are the reasons why this instrumental concern for ourselves is an integral part of our cognitive architecture.

