Despite the fact that Wittgenstein had oft expressed anti-foundationalist sentiments, for example, in his insistence that philosophy is an activity of analysing language, in truth he produced a theory in a form of a peculiar conceptual scheme. The aim of the book is to use this conceptual scheme just as Wittgenstein has recommended us to use his *Tractatus:* as an instrument (ladder) with the help of which we resolve philosophical problems, after which we move beyond it, making new investigations by the way of following the direction it gave us.

Wittgenstein’s conceptual scheme distilled in the book is build around a small family of bipolar categories: picturing and interpreting, expressing and intuiting, calculating and contemplating. Toward the end of his days, he articulated it with the help of the aspect-changing model of human mind. Wittgenstein was convinced that it gives the answer to his main problem of philosophy: ‘How human mind respond to particular task?’

This main problem has two sides:

(i) How the products of human thought, but also emotions, desires, dreams, and reveries,—and all the artefacts of human mind such as scientific theories, works of art,—emerge.

(ii) The logical side of this problem is what is the right judgement? We maintain that it is a function of *bona mens*—a term of Descartes meaning a well cultivated intuition for right (correct) thinking.

From the perspective of the conceptual scheme Wittgenstein advanced, mind is a kaleidoscope, composed of finite number of pieces. Their various rearrangements give rise to new pictures.

The so reconstructed Wittgensteinian model of human understanding theoretically substantiates a form of radical anti-essentialism. According to it, there are no transcendental objects—in any aspect of mind’s functioning whatsoever: epistemological, ontological, logical, ethical.

(i) In *philosophy of mind,* we embrace the holistic view, supported by some recent developments in cognitive sciences, that there is no dividing line between mind’s various departments: emotions, reason, volition, etc.
(ii) With the kaleidoscopic model we also explain the dynamic of mind’s products—the ontology of artefacts. We conceive of them as pictures. Pictures are copies, or visions of facts. What makes them different from other exact copies is that they are expressed visions. That is why men make different pictures (have different visions) of the same facts.

(iii) In epistemology this conception aims at abolishing of the, otherwise, enigmatic antagonism between knowledge and reality. According to us, pieces of knowledge are just new ways of seeing facts, rearranging them anew.

(iv) Logic advances models of the movement of human thinking. We can use these models for training in bona mens, in right reasoning.

(v) In the ethical aspect of mind’s functioning, the kaleidoscopic approach sees human life as changing of series of experiences—there are no transcendental episodes in it. The engine of these changes is our natural curiosity, the higher manifestation of which is the seeking of explanations: philosophy provides explanations. We develop this point in Part Third of the book.