ABSTRACT. Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl’s pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew’s book was the concept of the “given”. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap did the same when he wrote his *Aufbau*, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of *Erlebnisse*. This means, I argue, that both Moore’s sense-data and Carnap’s *Erlebnisse* have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the *sine qua non* practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic.

KEY WORDS: Carnap, early analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore, Michaltschew, Rehmke, sense-data, the given

1. INTRODUCTION: MOORE AND GERMAN-SPEAKING PHILOSOPHY

In recent years, several attempts have been made to show that Moore’s “revolution in philosophy”, which took place at the beginning of the twentieth century, was influenced by certain developments in the German-speaking philosophy of the time. Different avenues have been explored for this purpose. Some authors have claimed that in his formative years, Moore was under the decisive influence of Franz Brentano, an influence that came via George Stout (see Bell 1999); others turn their attention to similarities between Moore and Husserl (see Künne 1991).\(^1\) In a recent essay of mine I have shown that the roots of German influence on Moore are even older – indeed, they can be traced back to Lotze (see Milkov 2000, pp. 144–146).

In this paper I shall demonstrate that the young Moore became acquainted with works of another group of German-speaking philosophers – that of the Greifswald objectivists, who date from the beginning of the twentieth
century. Moreover, he showed considerable interest in them, and perhaps was even influenced by them. Unfortunately, today the school of the Greifswald objectivists – the most radical critics of psychologism in philosophy – has been consigned to oblivion. Not that the school was poor in ideas or arguments. The trouble is that in contrast to other Central European philosophical schools or philosophers, for example, to the school of the Austrian Brentanists, or to Frege, it failed to resurface after the Second World War: and this simply because it had no lobby among the professional philosophers.2

Fortunately, interest in the Greifswald objectivists has been recently revived by Martin Kusch (see Kusch 1995, pp. 99 and 118 ff.). This paper has been prompted by this newly awakened interest. I shall trace Moore’s connection with the Greifswald objectivists via one of his most obscure papers: his review of Dimitri Michaltschew, Philosophische Studien: Beiträge zur Kritik des modernen Psychologismus, published in the January issue of Mind, 1911. Even such a careful investigation of his philosophy as Thomas Baldwin’s G. E. Moore (Baldwin 1990) is silent about it. Why did he write it? What is its place in Moore’s philosophical development?

The objective of the present paper is, for one thing, to fill this gap in Moore studies. This I shall do in Part I. Further, in Part II, I am going to explore what made Moore, and also his friend Russell, different from those German philosophers with whom they sympathized most – the phenomenologists, the objectivists, the Brentanists – thus making them “analytic philosophers”, something their German-speaking masters, or minds related to them, were not.

I.

2. SOME FACTS OF MOORE’S PHILOSOPHICAL BIOGRAPHY IN THE 1900s

In order to find out why Moore wrote the Michaltschew Review at all, I am first going to locate it on the map of his philosophical development.

After he graduated from Cambridge in 1896, Moore won a six-year Fellowship at Cambridge’s Trinity College (1898–1904). These years were most successful for his philosophical career. In 1903 he published the programmatic paper “The Refutation of Idealism”. In the same year his magnum opus, Principia Ethica, was brought out. Despite the fact that the book won wide public recognition (among its admirers were such leading British intellectuals of the time as E. M. Forster, J. M. Keynes and Virginia
Woolf), however, Moore was not pleased with it. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that in the same year his closest philosophical friend – and rival – Bertrand Russell published the famous *The Principles of Mathematics*. This book convinced Moore that Russell was speeding ahead of him in philosophy and logic, and that he must make up for lost time.

As soon as his Fellowship came to end in 1904, Moore left Cambridge in order to live in comparative isolation in Edinburgh. Among other things, in these years he studied Russell’s new logical-philosophical ideas with great intensity. Around 1908, however, he started to feel that living in Edinburgh was harmful for his philosophical development. As a result, Moore moved to Richmond, Surrey, where he stayed until October 1911, when he was elected a University Lecturer in Moral Science at Cambridge. His years of philosophical exile in the non-Cambridge world had finally come to an end.

The years 1908–1911 are remembered by Moore’s biographers for the fact that during this time he finally produced his new synthesis in philosophy. The synthesis itself came to light in a course of twenty lectures “On Metaphysics”, delivered at Morley College, London, in the autumn 1910–winter 1911. The lectures were written out in a completely finished form and merely read to the audience (see Moore 1942, p. 27), so that more than forty years later they were published almost without changes as *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* (1953). In short, Moore saw the task of these lectures as being to metaphysically assimilate the new logical results Russell had reached. This was a first such attempt, later followed by Russell himself starting with *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and finishing with the lectures “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1917–1918). It is significant that Russell read the manuscript of Moore’s lectures and that he used them extensively in his writings of the 1910s. This fact highlights the prominence of Moore’s lectures in the history of early analytic philosophy.

All these biographic facts about Moore and his philosophical development are of help in answering the question why he wrote the Michaltschew review at all. My tentative answer is that he wrote it in preparation for his “On Metaphysics” lectures of 1910–1911. The first reason for this guess (other reasons will be given below) is that the review, published in January 1911, was very probably written in the summer of 1910, when the composition of the lectures was at full speed.
This was – to focus on formal features – the last extensive review of the sixteen that Moore wrote in his lifetime. It can be guessed that review-writing was a genre to which Moore addressed himself above all in the years of his philosophical apprenticeship. After he delivered the “On Metaphysics” lectures in 1910–1911, and after he assumed the Lectureship appointment in Cambridge in October 1911, Moore apparently felt that his metaphysics had received its final shape. In consequence, he ceased to be interested in philosophy produced outside Cambridge and stopped writing reviews altogether.

A further formal observation. The majority of these sixteen reviews had books of ethics as their subject, while only three were on pure philosophy. Even more interesting is the fact that these last-mentioned three reviews were all of works by German-speaking philosophers. Evidently, these figures are not important in themselves. The crux is that Moore wrote these three reviews when he was in serious philosophical trouble, confronted with the task of breaking new ground in his philosophy. In other words, he used the works of certain German philosophers as both reference points and as a guide in his tentative efforts to advance new philosophical theory.

Moore wrote his first review of a book by a German philosopher in the spring of 1905, when he discussed Hans Cornelius’s Einleitung in die Philosophie (Cornelius 1903). Cornelius, to remind the reader, was a “critical realist” from Munich, an admirer and follower of Ernst Mach. His book was interesting to Moore because it was occupied with one single (and to Moore’s thinking, the central) problem of philosophy: How does mind relate to matter? Does matter exist independently of mind, or does it not? Cornelius claimed that when trying to answer such questions, he is a consistent objectivist.

Moore himself had been interested in the problem of objectivism/subjectivism since his revolt against idealism in 1898. In 1904/1905, however, he faced a much more concrete – and difficult – task: that of reformulating his objectivism according to the new developments in logic introduced by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions” (1904). In the latter paper, to remind the reader, Russell discriminates between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description for the first time (see Milkov 2001, p. 229). This was a clear move in direction of objectivism.

These developments explain why Moore found Cornelius’s book disappointing: he soon became convinced that this author was not a true
objectivist. Indeed, Cornelius identifies objective existence with the conception of “regular connexion between our perceptions” – not between objects themselves (Moore 1905a, p. 251). That solution, however, cannot rid us of solipsism. Cornelius holds furthermore “that the experience of other minds is wholly inaccessible to ‘empirical’ and ‘scientific’ proof” (ibid.). This prompted Moore’s sharply critical reception of the book.

Moore made his next step towards objectivism in his first reaction to Russell’s “On Denoting”, which found expression in his paper “The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception” (Moore 1905b), read on December 18, 1905. In it he maintained that a “class of data” we perceive can be called “sense-contents”: patches of colour with dimension, for instance, as well as form and spatial relations. Sense-contents are those things which are perceived not only by me, but by other minds too – in this way, they represent a way out of solipsism (p. 83). At the same time, Moore now rejected the notion that we perceive material objects directly. To be more precise, following the new ideas developed in “On Denoting”, he claimed that there are two different types of existents: sense-contents and material objects.

4. ON HUSSERL’S INFLUENCE ON MOORE

“Moore admired the Logische Untersuchungen [of Husserl].”
W. R. Boyce Gibson (Spiegelberg 1975, p. 15)

In 1909–1910, Moore was again pondering which philosophical road to take. Now, however, his task was a much more ambitious one: it was to write down the first full sketch of the New Philosophy, later called “analytic”.

It was in this context that Moore wrote his second review of a German philosopher’s book – on August Messer’s Empfindung und Denken (Messer 1908), published in the July issue of Mind, 1910. This review can be seen as “a sort of companion piece to [the paper of Moore’s] ‘The Subject-Matter of Psychology’” (Künne 1991, p. 105) which was read to the Aristotelian Society in London on December 6, 1909. Indeed, “The Subject-Matter of Psychology” systematically developed conceptions which Moore had distilled from Messer’s book.

This fact is of utmost importance, since it provides evidence for the considerable, though indirect, influence of Husserl on the founding fathers of analytic philosophy: Moore and Russell. I have come to this conclusion by following up a clue given by Wolfgang Künne, who has recently asserted that August Messer’s book Empfindung und Denken “is nothing
but a rather faithful summary of Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*” (ibid.) and that Moore found Messer’s work “an extraordinarily good book”. How highly he appreciated its ideas is clear from the fact that he applied them in his “On Metaphysics” lectures on a large scale.

Exactly which ideas of Husserl and Messer’s was it then that influenced Moore? He was particularly interested in Husserl–Messer’s “attempt to classify all the kinds of elements which may occur as constituents of mental phenomena” (Moore 1910, p. 395). On the basis of this classification, Messer went on to describe all the relations between the different parts of mind. In other words, Messer’s book offered a good example of the development of a conceptual scheme of the ontology of mind based on objective (non-psychological) mind-elements.

As a matter of fact, Moore had already advanced such a scheme – an objective conceptual framework constructed from realistic elements – in *Principia Ethica*. Moreover, a rudimentary, realistic conceptual scheme was advanced by Moore and Russell as early in 1898–1903 (e.g., in Moore’s paper “The Nature of Judgement”). Roughly, it consisted of subject, object and the relation between them. The task of assimilating Russell’s discoveries in philosophical logic of 1903–1905, however, led Moore of necessity to introduce new, more refined elements into it; and it was exactly for this purpose that he borrowed some of Husserl–Messer’s ideas.

Where Moore followed them closest of all was in accepting that there is a variety of mental acts – supposing, judging, fearing, hoping, desiring, liking, disliking – which in turn are subdivisions of three great classes: cognitive acts, emotional acts and acts of will. Moreover, he held “that every act of feeling or of will is always ‘founded’ upon a cognitive act directed to the same object” (Moore 1910, p. 400).

This idea was endorsed by Russell right away. In *Theory of Knowledge* (1913), for instance, he claimed that there are different mental acts – judging, feeling, willing and desiring. Mental acts of diverse types are cases of different cognitive relations, every one of which has its own logical form (see Russell 1983, pp. 125 ff.). This conception was developed further in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) and “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1917/1918).

These pieces of evidence show how significant the impact of Husserl on the rising Cambridge analytic philosophy was. Clearly, this topic can only be mentioned in passing here, but suffice it to say that the phenomenologists pushed the two Cambridge men in the direction of a detailed philosophy (ontology) of mind. An echo of this influence can be traced in the philosophical psychology of Russell’s *The Analysis of Mind* (1921).
and especially in Wittgenstein’s investigations in philosophical psychology of 1945–1949.

This point help us also to understand and articulate some similarities between the early analytic philosophers and the phenomenologists. Above all, both claim that there is an objective world, including our mental world, and that the task of philosophy is to describe it. In § 8, (c), we shall see that this claim was \textit{sine qua non} for early analytic philosophy.

5. MICHALTSCHEW AND THE GREIFSWALD OBJECTIVISTS

Moore’s paper “The Subject-Matter of Psychology” also introduced another major concept to early analytic philosophy, with most important consequences: the term \textit{sense-data}.\textsuperscript{6} A year later he discussed this term in his “On Metaphysics” lectures.

My claim is that it was with the precise intention of clarifying his concept of sense-data for himself that Moore wrote a review of a third book on philosophy written in German: Dimitri Michaltschew’s \textit{Philosophische Studien}. It is even possible that Moore introduced the term under the influence of this book. Indeed, as already mentioned, the lecture “The Subject-Matter of Psychology” was read on December 6, 1909, while Michaltschew’s book had been published some twelve months earlier.\textsuperscript{7} In the second (April) issue of \textit{Mind} for 1909 (vol. 18) we find it listed among the “New Books Received” (p. 309).\textsuperscript{8} This shows that Moore would have had time enough to become acquainted with the book at least, before he started to write his paper “The Subject-Matter of Psychology”, presumably in October–November 1909.

But who on earth was Dimitri Michaltschew? In addition to his relative obscurity elsewhere, this most eminent of Bulgarian philosophers (1880–1967) has been consigned to oblivion in his own country for the last 60 years. Here however is a man who, during his four years of post-graduate study in Greifswald with the German objectivist Johannes Rehmke, managed to write a voluminous work subtitled \textit{Contributions to the Criticism of the Modern Psychologism}. The importance of the book arises from the fact that it appeared before his teacher’s manifesto – Rehmke’s \textit{Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft} was published a year later (Rehmke 1910). In his Preface to Michaltschew’s book, Rehmke himself called it \textit{filius ante patrem}, and at the same time pronounced that it promulgated a wholly new strain of philosophy that elaborated a most radical form of anti-psychologism. Moore, who had fought against psychologism (and naturalism) in philosophy for years, was, of course, intrigued.
The book was widely reviewed in the press of the time. Besides Mind, six other journals wrote about it. In The Philosophical Review for 1910, for example, we read: “[Michaltschew] is very successful in making his ideas clear, and his constructive results are interesting, if slow in coming to the surface” (Fite 1910, pp. 323–324).

Some historical word about the Greifswald objectivists: As their ancestors are considered the “immanents” Richard von Schubert-Soldern and Wilhelm Schuppe. (The immanents, as one may recall, embraced the belief that there is no difference between subject and object in epistemology.) Between 1873 and 1910 Wilhelm Schuppe held a Chair of Philosophy at the University in Greifswald. In 1885 he organized the appointment of Rehmke as a professor of philosophy there; Rehmke thought in Geifswald until 1921. The second generation of Greifswald objectivists includes the names Willi Moog and Johannes Erich Heyde. Hans Driesch and Günther Jacoby, whom I shall refer to again in § 7, were also close to the Greifswald objectivists. In the 1920s and 1930s the philosophy of the Greifswald objectivists attracted many followers. Between 1919 and 1931 this group published the journal Grundwissenschaft. Philosophische Zeitschrift der Johannes-Rehmke-Gesellschaft.

6. THE GIVEN: SENSE-DATA, CONCEPTUAL-DATA

Where, however, is the evidence that Moore wrote this review in order to clear up the sense-data issue for himself; or even that he introduced the term under the influence of this book?

For one thing, in Michaltschew’s book the concept of the “given” – Gegebene, in German, or datum, in Latin – is central, and of “extreme importance” to him (Moore 1911, p. 114). Michaltschew fails to define it specifically, but it follows from what he says on many occasions that for him “given” means “directly known”, or “immediately given”. Further, he claims that everything that we find in our consciousness is given. This claim was the consequence of the Greifswald objectivists’ acceptance of “epistemological monism”: the subject is absolutely transparent; it does not leave a trace on the objects and phenomena it know.

Let is now compare Michaltschew’s conception of the given to Moore’s conception of sense-data. (1) According to the Greifswald objectivist, “the givenness is still not determined” (Michaltschew 1909, p. 110); it is “the undetermined [unbestimmte] multiplicity” (ibid., p. 505). That is why we cannot ask anything about the given. We determine the given in judgements – it is in judgement that we start to discern the multiplicity and diversity of the given.
Moore, for his part, had accepted that there is a class of objects which we cannot define already in *Principia Ethica*, “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), and “The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception” (1905). Such “indefinables” are the colours, truth/falsehoods, sizes, shapes, existences, movements, relations, situations, etc. We know all of them immediately. The novelty in Moore’s metaphysics in and immediately after December 1909 was that now he saw the indefinables that we know through senses as particular objects, with specific location. These objects are different from material objects; the former are related to the latter, but cannot be reduced to them.

(2) Michaltschew claims that what is given, and so objective, is “what is in the consciousness, no matter whether it is real or not, whether it is a fantasy or a dream, psychical or physical, a stone or a feeling, particular or general” (ibid., p. 109). Similarly, Moore assumes that perceptions when dreaming, day-dreaming, etc. are objective sense-data. Here is Moore’s definition of sense-data, dating from 6 December 1909:

By sense-data I understand a class of entities of which we are very often directly conscious, and with many of which we are extremely familiar. They include the colours, of all sorts of different shades, which I actually see when I look about me; the sounds which I actually hear; the peculiar sort of entity of which I am directly conscious when I feel the pain of a toothache, and which I call “the pain”; and many others which I need not enumerate. But I wish also to include among them those entities called “images”, of which I am directly conscious when I dream and often also when awake. (Moore 1909/1910, p. 57)

What makes sense-data of material objects different from the sense-data of dreams is the character of their relation to one another.

The only difference – albeit a very important one – between Michaltschew’s epistemology on the one hand, and Moore’s and also Russell’s on the other, was in their view of how we know material objects, as well as concepts, such as numbers, abstract objects, etc. According to Moore–Russell of this period, both material objects and concepts are “incomplete symbols”, signified by denoting phrases that are to be analysed down to their constituents – the sense-data.11 This view was based on the conviction that there is a radical difference between sense-data and (logical) constructions which are built on them.

In contrast, according to Rehmke–Michaltschew, *everything* we know, or know about, is given to us – not only our perceptions but also all our knowledge of material objects, as well as of scientific and logical truths. In other words, what is in our consciousness and is not a sense-datum is a conceptual datum. Things signified by denoting phrases, Russellian style, are given as well. We can analyse them into particular data, but we need not do so; they are in order as they are. The universal and particular exist side by side in them, closely connected one with another (see § 9).
Moore found this conception “extremely paradoxical” (Moore 1911, p. 114). Certainly, there are many things that we do know, with which we are not directly acquainted – the multiplication table, for example, as well as other mathematical and logical truths, or the general truths of science. The same is true of physical objects, according to Moore of 1909–1914. By the way, this signifies a radical change in his position from “The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception”. As already mentioned (in § 3), at that time Moore called “sense-content” – the ancestor of the concept of sense-data – a “class of data” (Moore 1905b, p. 83). Obviously, this mode of expression presupposes that there are other classes of data which we do not know immediately: the material objects, for example. Now, in 1911, Moore had arrived at the position that only the sense-data are “given”.

7. ON CARNAP’S DEBT TO THE GREIFSWALD OBJECTIVISTS

Moore, however, was not the only early analytic philosopher who noticed how close to his philosophical intuition the objectivism of the Greifswald philosophers was. In the 1920s, another early analytic philosopher who was even better acquainted with German philosophy than Moore – Rudolf Carnap – discovered the Greifswald objectivists for himself. This he did in his 1924 paper “The Three-Dimensionality of Space and Causality”, in which he postulated the Aufbau programme of constructing the external world from the given for the first time. In particular, in this paper he introduced the distinction between the primary and the secondary world of experience. The first comprises the world of phenomena, the second the world of physical objects. Carnap similarly identified the primary world of experience with the given in the sense of Rehmke (1910) and tried further to build the secondary world on it (see Carnap 1924, p. 108). This means that his view of the primary experience contrasted the view of the given in both conventional empiricism and neo-Kantianism. Indeed, unlike the neo-Kantians, Carnap assumed that the form is already present in the world of phenomena or in the primary world of experience. It must not first be introduced into it – in the very process of cognising. To put this in another perspective, contrary to empiricism, he claimed that the primary world of the given is already put into a form; it is not amorphous.

The same was in fact claimed by both Moore and Russell – and at this point the two philosophers are most often misunderstood. Their sense-data are not only simple but also complex items which combine empirical and formal elements into one (see Milkov 2001). Indeed, as already pointed out in § 6, the sense-data of Moore–Russell are not only indefinables given in our senses, but at the same time have such formal properties as
In Aufbau Carnap used the concept of the given – with reference to Rehmke – in a similar sense (see Carnap 1928, §§ 64 f.). But in this book Carnap also refers to two philosophers who, as already mentioned, are considered the ancestors of the Greifswald objectivists: the immanent philosophers Richard von Schubert-Soldern and Wilhelm Schuppe.

In this connection, I would like to briefly address another point. In recent years, two investigations of Carnap’s Aufbau have been published, reassessing this important work of early analytic philosophy (see Richardson 1998; Friedman 1999). Both claim that Quine’s earlier interpretation of this work as empiricist, allegedly coming after “Russell’s reductionism”, is false. In fact, according to Richardson and Friedman, at that time Carnap was much more of a neo-Kantian than a Russellian. His task was to find out how objective science can be reconstructed out of private experience.

I have two objections to this interpretation. (1) *Pace* Quine, Russell and still less Moore were not reductionists. (2) Carnap accomplished his task, above all, with the help of the German objectivists who, far from being neo-Kantians, were in fact anti-Kantians: viz. Rehmke together with Hans Driesch, Günther Jacoby (who received a philosophy professorship in Greifswald in 1928) and Hugo Dingler, as well as the immanents Schuppe and von Schubert-Soldern. This, incidentally, can be seen from the book’s Index of Names alone, in which the references to neo-Kantians are far fewer in number than those to the German objectivists.

All of these six authors were objectivists in the sense that they were anti-psychologists. All of them save Dingler were either members of the Greifswald objectivist group, or were close to them. If we really wish to put the Greifswald objectivists into one of the philosophical pigeon-holes of the time, we would be justified in adding them to the Austrian Brentanists, but most certainly not to the neo-Kantians. Incidentally, they were classified so in the numerous books aiming to delineate the main currents (*die Hauptströmungen*) in German-speaking philosophy of the time (see e.g., Lehmann 1943, pp. 113 f.; Moog 1922, p. 207; Müller-Freienfels 1923, p. 60).

I shall naturally not pursue this matter here in detail. I have mentioned it only in order to show that the Greifswald objectivist conception of given was undeniably close to the theoretical intuitions and tastes of the early analytic philosophers in general, and not only to those of G. E. Moore. But exactly how close was it?
I shall try to answer this question in this part of the paper. In it I shall set out, on the basis of the historical analysis provided in Part I, the nature of analytic philosophy, in the sense of the philosophy of Moore-Russell of 1905–1914, differentiating sharply between it and that which is not analytic philosophy in this sense. Further, I shall try to set out what connects early analytic philosophy to phenomenology and the school of the Greifswald objectivists, and what makes them different. My method will be to identify those philosophical practices that are *qua non* analytic philosophy. If one of them was not exploited by a given philosophical school or group, this means that in all probability it was not truly analytic.

8. GRIEFSWALD OBJECTIVISTS AND THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

A careful comparative analysis of the Greifswald objectivists and the Cambridge early analytic philosophers shows that the North Germans were not analytic philosophers for at least three reasons.

(a) The Greifswald Objectivists were not Exact Philosophers. Moore’s review of Michaltschew was a last example of a method that he followed at the time, a method that I have called “analytic hermeneutics” elsewhere (see Milkov 1997, i, pp. 162 ff., 178). This was a technique of close inspection of the philosophical texts with the aim of pin-pointing “the various meanings of a given ambiguous expression” (White 1958, pp. 74–75), thus deconstructing it to the level of everyday language. Moore applied this method for the first time in “In What Sense, If Any, Do Past and Future Exist?” (1897) and developed it further in “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903); it bore its ripest fruits in the papers “Professor James’ ‘Pragmatism’ ” (1908), and “Hume’s Philosophy” (1909). In all these papers Moore’s objective was to show that the philosopher under scrutiny uses ideas (concepts, theories) in a sense that is significantly different from the sense in which this very philosopher believes that he uses them. The new – analytic – philosophy is different. Its basic method is to avoid speculations and unclear ideas and to proceed slowly and circumspectly in its investigation, step by step, using only speculation-free, “aseptic” concepts.

Michaltschew’s book, according to Moore, is confusing in this sense. Above all, it discusses too many notions and problems without first making them clear. Thus the meaning of the concept of *given* is not explained in it at all, in spite of the pronounced emphasis that the author puts on it. Further, Michaltschew criticises many philosophical theories *en bloc*, without
differentiating between them: Rickert’s “teleological criticism”, Mach’s “emprio-criticism”, Meinong’s theory of objects, Husserl’s phenomenology are often lumped together only in order to be collectively discarded away. In particular, for him all of them are guilty of psychologism: they accept that what is given cannot subsist independently of consciousness.

Moreover, Michaltschew brings forward no argument in support of his understanding of the given whatsoever; and this is a serious shortcoming which reveals him once more to be a pre-analytic philosopher. Indeed, to Moore, philosophy consists first and foremost of advancing reasons and arguments.

(b) The Greifswald Objectivists were not Linguistic Philosophers. The Greifswald objectivists were also pre-propositional. Indeed, they failed to join that form of anti-psychologism, or objectivism, which followed the so called “propositional turn”. The latter was taken in most radical form by Frege; after 1905 it was embraced by Russell and Moore (in his “On Metaphysics” lectures), and later also by Wittgenstein. From this stance, the starting point in philosophy is the analysis of propositions, not simply the analysis of knowledge.

To be fair, Michaltschew and Rehmke were also against the influence of grammar on philosophy. They claimed that grammar misleads us to believe that judgement synthesises elements of the given into one. In fact, what synthesises is the language, whereas judgement discriminates – and so determines – the multiplicity of the given. Michaltschew–Rehmke did not, however, base this claim on conceptions of philosophical logic introduced with the propositional turn.

(c) Greifswald Objectivists were not Descriptive Philosophers The latter point brings us to the next “analytic deficiency” of the Greifswald objectivists. Their philosophy was not only inexact and pre-propositional; it was also non-descriptivist. Indeed, in contrast to both Husserl–Messer and Moore–Russell, Michaltschew’s metaphysics does not aim at advancing a conceptual scheme which is articulated in descriptions. As we have already seen in § 4, the conceptual scheme of Husserl–Messer’s ontology of mind discriminates between a subject, a cognitive relation and an object. Further, it accepts that there are many kinds of cognitive relations, or mental acts: sense-perception (seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling), remembering, dreaming, imagining, thinking, observing. Besides mental acts, there are also other ways of knowing that things exist: memory, the already cited direct knowing of material objects, etc. All these mental acts and ways of knowing build up a well-ramified conceptual scheme which can be described in great detail.
There is no such a conceptual scheme in the philosophy of Rehmke–Michaltschew, however. The aim of the Greifswald objectivists – similarly to the aim of other “continental” philosophers of the time, Henry Bergson, for example – was, instead, to make a philosophical discovery: to find out how mind and matter are connected, at one stroke, after which the whole of philosophy would be reformed.14

9. A PRÉCIS ON GREIFSWALD OBJECTIVISTS’ PHILOSOPHY

In order to show this, in this section I shall present a short description of Rehmke–Michaltschew’s objectivist philosophy. It made two claims, and tried further to solve all philosophical problems in terms of these. Above all, it accepted the pair categories particular–universal as central to philosophy. Moreover, it claimed that we find the universals in particulars; conversely, particulars are sums of universals. In this way, it accepted that universal and particular do not exist separately but are always “given” together.

In addition, Greifswald objectivists introduced the discrimination between real and objective: real (wirklich) is what acts upon (wirkt), whereas objective is what is merely given. Real is this aeroplane, this desk; objective is my dream of a golden mountain. In particular, Rehmke–Michaltschew discriminate between matter and soul using the same principle. The objects (Dinge) of the matter act upon other objects and so are real. In contrast, souls and consciousnesses do not act upon one another: they are only objective.

The same marriage between real and objective can be found between universals and particulars: The universal is objective, the particular is real. Particulars change when the universals composing them come and go. Universals themselves, however, do not change. Particulars have such real characteristics as size, shape and location. Objective items, such as universals and souls, have no such characteristics.

Further, persons are individuals; they are not merely particulars (i.e. bodies or minds). They are the interaction (Wirkenszusammenhang) between two particulars: the body and the mind. The secondary qualities, on their part, are effect of the interaction between the person and the object.

10. THE SECOND ELEMENT OF THE EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Despite the fact that they followed this old-fashioned one-stroke approach to philosophy, at the same time Rehmke–Michaltschew joined the most
modern movement in scientific philosophy of the time – the objectivist anti-psychologism. What is more, the anti-psychologism of the Greifswald objectivists was much more radical than that of their German-speaking contemporaries and, so, closer to Moore–Russell than any other philosophical school of the time.

Here I would remind the reader of a most important difference between Moore–Russell on the one hand, and the two coryphaei of the German-speaking philosophy in about 1900, Frege and Husserl, on the another. Whereas the former accepted the conceptual scheme subject-act-object, the scheme of the latter was subject-act-content-object. The Cambridge realists rejected the content and so embraced the most straightforward and direct form of objectivism. In this respect they were closer to Rehmke–Michaltschew than to Frege or Husserl. This is also what constitutes the difference between Moore and Husserl–Messer. Whereas the latter believe that two acts having the same object can differ because of their “interpretative sense” (Auffassungssinn), “according to Moore the so-called difference in content of two acts with the same primary objects is ‘in reality’ the difference between their secondary objects. And this Husserl would not accept” (Künne 1991, p. 111).

In theory of truth, Michaltschew is again closer to Moore–Russell than to Frege or Husserl. He rejects the distinction made by the latter between being (genesis) and value. Frege for example accepts it in the form of distinction between sense (concept, thought) and meaning (truth-value). In contrast, Michaltschew claims that “to say ‘It is true that so and so is the case’ is equivalent to saying, ‘So and so is really (in Wirklichkeit) the case’” (Moore 1911, p. 115). By this, he apparently means that “every ‘true’ sentence must express something which ‘exists’, in the sense in which particular things and persons exist at some times and not at others” (ibid.).

Here the closeness with which Michaltschew’s position is related to that of Moore–Russell is obvious. As a matter of fact, in his discussion with Frege of 1904, Russell was eager to point out, as if in agreement with Greifswald objectivists, the following:

I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition “Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high”. We do not assert the thought, for this is a private psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought. (Frege 1980, p. 169)

This position, called the “identity theory of truth” by some contemporary philosophers is very close to Michaltschew’s theory of truth.

The only difference is, again, that, in contrast to Michaltschew, Russell also assumed that true propositions refer to denoting phrases, such as
“The author of Waverley”, or “The infinite number”. The words in such phrases have meaning by virtue of the logical form of the phrases, but not in isolation. Exactly this conception – the Principle of Context Definition – introduced a new argument against psychologism in philosophy that was apparently unknown to Michaltschew and which can be called the “argument from philosophy of language” assumed with the propositional turn.

11. EPILOGUE

In the last section I have shown why phenomenologists were not true (early) analytic philosophers – they were rather too psychological and subjective. This stance of the phenomenologists was developed in full by the later Husserl and his followers. It is true that subjectivist (also known as “epistemological”) elements are also to be found in Frege’s logic (his acceptance of content, that is). They, however, were compensated for with possibly the strictest form of deduction and analytism.

Here it is to be noted that this approach – the use of the availability of a philosophical practice as a criterion for the analyticity of this or that philosophy – also had its flip side. There was a part of the philosophy of the Greifswald objectivists which is close to similar elaborations on the part of the phenomenologists, for which there is no equivalent in either Moore–Russell or Frege, and which can be quite well developed in the context of the contemporary (as opposed to the early) analytic philosophy. What I mean here is, above all, the programme for mathesis universalis advanced by both the early phenomenologists and by the Greifswald objectivists: the latter did this in the project for “fundamental science” (Grundwissenschaft) which precedes logic and is more basic than it. And while the phenomenologists’ programme for mathesis universalis was already “remixed” by some contemporary analytic philosophers (see e.g., Smith 1982), the task of revitalising the Greifswald project for “fundamental science” in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy, is one that still awaits attention.

NOTES

1 I shall discuss this strain of influence on Moore in §4.
2 Here I agree with Martin Kush and Peter Simons that “the way philosophical disputes get decided and the way subsequent history is written depend little on the dialectical strength, adequacy or sophistication of the position posed” (Simons 1997, p. 442).
3 Cf. this note of Moore’s: “I worked very hard indeed for a very long time in trying to understand his [Russell’s] Principles of Mathematics; and I actually wrote a very long review of this work, which was however never published” (Moore 1942, p. 15).

4 The only exception were three short reviews of his – of one page each – of new books of philosophers he became acquainted and made friends with in Cambridge: in 1921 of W. E. Johnson’s Logic and of Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Mind, and in 1927 of A. N. Whitehead’s Religion in the Making.

5 Under the indirect influence of Husserl’s teacher Franz Brentano (see Bell 1999).

6 On fact, the term sense-data was also in use in philosophy before December 6, 1909. As I have recently shown (see Milkov 2001), it was introduced in 1882 by Josiah Royce. In the early 1890s the term was widely used by William James. In 1896–1898 Russell incidentally spoke of sense-data too. In the next thirteen years, however, he apparently forgot this – indeed, between 1898 and 1911 he didn’t use the term at all. This explains why Russell was thus impressed by Moore’s innovation of December 1909. Thus in the “Preface” to The Problems of Philosophy, he expressly acknowledged that he followed Moore’s “On Metaphysics” lectures on the concept of sense-data (see Russell 1912, p. v).

7 The book was actually published in December 1908. See Michalschew (1996, pp. 83 f.).

8 Messer’s book Empfindung und Denken was listed in the same issue of Mind on p. 308. It may well be that Moore had gone through this list of newly received book and picked them out for reviewing.

9 Heyde wrote the article “Rehmke” in Paul Edwards’s Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (see Heyde 1967).

10 Incidentally, this conception is conspicuously close to the view on the subject as exposed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 5.631–5.633.

11 Only by Russell was this doctrine laid out in such a clear form (e.g., in Russell 1912). Moore, in contrast, “is symptomatically unclear about this matter” (Baldwin 1990, p. 155). Nevertheless, Russell’s theory of incomplete symbols undoubtedly underlies Moore’s conception of material objects of the time.

12 The last three papers were published in Moore (1922).

13 This point is developed with exemplary clarity in Dummett (1993).

14 Gerhard Lehmann expressed this point as follows: Rehmke’s works “are poor in material, but consistent in following the path once chosen” (Lehmann 1943, p. 117).

15 Originally launched by Lotze (see on this Gabriel 1989, p. xi), and followed by Christoph Sigwart and Wilhelm Wundt, among others.

16 Introduced by Lotze again.


REFERENCES


