Hermann Lotze’s *Microcosm*

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Opening

Lotze’s *Microcosm* was published in three volumes, in 1856, 1858 and 1864, respectively. It was soon one of the most widely read philosophy books of the time. It was translated into French and Russian immediately, into English in 1885/87, and into Italian in 1911/16. The book saw six editions in Germany alone by 1923. Its last editor, Raymund Schmidt, wrote in his preface “Lotze will never be a modern [author] again, we shall never evidence a neo-Lotzeanism or something of the sort, but [his *Microcosm*] will always be read as a part of the education of young philosophers and for deepening the education of every thinking man”.

Unfortunately, this prophecy proved false. After the Great War in the English-speaking world, and after 1929 in Germany, Lotze (1817–1881) was almost totally forgotten. My guess is that the reason was the analytic-continental divide in philosophy, which reigned for the last eighty years with almost uncompromising insensitivity. Forgetting all other styles of doing their discipline, philosophers enthusiastically sided with one of the two camps. This, of course, is highly ironical, since Lotze can be considered the grandfather of both analytic philosophy and phenomenology. My hope is that with the end of the schism—now on the horizon—Lotze’s philosophy in general, and his *Microcosm* in particular, will experience the revival they surely deserve. Here I shall revisit this work with the aim of excerpting from it interesting points for the reader of today. I shall do this in two steps. In Part One I shall describe the leading ideas, the method(s), and the history of the work. In Part Two I shall pass through some of its particular themes.

Part One

Set-Up and First Characterization

The incidental reader of Lotze’s *Microcosm* today will be surprised by the freshness of this work. Its very content is exciting. It shows a book which discusses...
themes which are today almost forgotten; or it puts prima facie alien themes side by side, inspiring deep insight. Briefly, in Microcosm Lotze charts a map of philosophy which is rather alien—in an exciting way—to contemporary philosophers.

The three volumes of the book discuss, respectively, the Body, Man, and History; or, the physiological person, the social person, and society as such. In the volume on the psychological person, her stream of consciousness is discussed (in the second book on Soul). The first volume ends with an examination of life in its different forms. In the second volume on man, first her relatedness to and differences from other animals are investigated. It follows an analysis of mind in which a special stress is put on a person’s sensuality and feeling of pleasure and pain. This analysis prompts Lotze to make consumption (genießen) a central concept in anthropology. His discussion of man continues in chapters on language and thinking and on knowing and truth. Finally, the author examines man in his macrocosmic (terrestrial and cosmic), as well as in his microcosmic (in his relation to other people in family and society) environment. In the final volume, on history, Lotze examines progress, different cultures and forms of life, private and political economy, different forms of work and leisure, and art. The volume ends with Lotze’s philosophy of religion.

We can see Microcosm, among other things, as a book in popular philosophy. An example of this is Lotze’s examination of the differences and relatedness between man and woman: The corporal needs of women are less than those of men. Women get accustomed to new environments more easily, whereas men eliminate the traces of their early education and formation only with much effort. Further, the intellectual capacities of the two genders are not substantially different. Rather, more often than not they use them for different purposes, and with different attitudes. Roughly, men’s knowledge and will are directed to the general, those of women to the whole. Men like analysis, mechanical explanations, women have preference for the living, for coziness (Gemütlichkeit), for the beautiful, for closed wholes. Women are good at bringing order in space, men in time. Property is what is important for men, while women often live wastefully. To a woman’s heart the truth has another meaning than for men. Women are inclined to accept appearances; they have predilection for surrogates.

Being an essay in popular philosophy, the book was a break in what Schopenhauer had called Kathederphilosophie, the university philosophy that dominated post-Kantian Germany. The latter was rather scholastic, far away from the general conversation of mankind. I deem it enlightening to see Microcosm (1856–64) as the middle member of a chain of books which appeared in mid-nineteenth-century Germany, the other two members of which were the second volume of Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea (1844), and Nietzsche’s first philosophical book Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1872). All three books were essays in popular philosophy.
The Place of the *Microcosm* in Lotze’s Philosophical Development

The place of the *Microcosm* in Lotze’s philosophical development was judged differently in the literature. Some authors (for example, J E Erdmann, E W Orth) believe that this was his most important book. Others hold the contrary opinion: the book was only a popular statement of his philosophy which was developed on a more theoretical level in his *Logic* (1874) and *Metaphysics* (1879).

We can get a more objective perspective on this point if we trace out the place of this book in his philosophical development. To cut a long story short, a key for understanding this book-project is the fact that Lotze had earned two doctorates, in two fields: medicine, and philosophy. Further, he became a Privatdozent (received a venia legendi) in these two disciplines and even practiced as a medical doctor for a year in Zittau. Lotze’s career in philosophy can be seen as being programmed by this double qualification. It is true that he chose academic philosophy as a profession. However, the influence of his medical training was felt all the time, in two respects. First, his overall philosophy was permeated with striving for scientific exactness: Lotze criticized any whiff of mysticism or speculative inspiration. Secondly, he devoted many academic years to—more or less philosophic—studies in medicine and physiology. A result of his efforts in this direction was his grounding works in psychology which give reason to celebrate him today as one of this field’s founding fathers.

We can see this trait of Lotze’s work simply by making a quick review of his publications. At first Lotze published, at the age of 24 and 26, respectively, his ‘small’ *Metaphysics* (1841) and ‘small’ *Logic* (1843), in which he charted his philosophical program. His Habilitation in medicine was published in the same period under the title *Allgemeine Pathologie und Therapie als mechanische Naturwissenschaften* (1842). In the next ten years Lotze worked on problems lying on the edge between medicine and philosophy, in particular, on the relation between soul and body. The results of these studies were published in two books: *Allgemeine Physiologie des körperlichen Lebens* (1851) and *Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele* (1852). In these years Lotze also published extensive essays on “Leben. Lebenskraft” (1843), “Instinct” (1844), and “Seele und Seelenleben” (1846). In the late 1840s he published important works on aesthetics: “Über den Begriff der Schönheit” (1845), “Über Bedingungen der Kunstschönheit” (1847), and “Quaestiones Lucretianae” (1852).

*Microcosm* marked a new period in Lotze’s philosophical development. In this monumental work, he made a synthesis of his ideas advanced so far: of the logico-metaphysical ideas of 1841–43, of his psychological ideas of 1842–52, and of his aesthetic ideas of 1845–52. This means that—and we are going to see this in the lines to come—the book was not simply a popular treatise. It also developed most serious (deep and technical) logical and metaphysical ideas in a form that was unknown in his theoretical project from 1841–43.

Shortly after Lotze finished *Microcosm*, he started his *System of Philosophy* which consisted of his ‘large’ *Logic* (1874), and ‘large’ *Metaphysics* (1879). The third part of the system on *Ethic/Aesthetics/Religious Philosophy*, remained unfinished. Roughly, the difference between these two book-projects can be set out...
Three Traditions of Microcosmic Studies

Surprisingly enough, the very term ‘microcosm’ was used only three times in the book, and not in its body but: (a) in the Introductory Remark to the whole work; (b) in the Conclusion to Volume One; and (c) in the Contents of Book Six, Chapter One—interestingly, in the chapter itself he did not make use of it. In (b) and (c) Lotze speaks of the microcosm as ‘the lesser world’. Now, why was Lotze so shy about speaking of microcosm? My guess is that this was a measure taken against the danger that his work might be conceived in the old German tradition of microcosmic studies à la Paracelsus and Jacob Böhme.

In this connection I should remind the reader that there are, at least, three traditions of microcosmic study. (1) The first one, much more popular than the other two, accepts that men—or other lesser monads—and universe “are constructed according to the same harmonic proportions, each sympathetically attuned to the other, each a cosmos ordered according to reason. By an imaginative leap, the universe itself [i]s thought to be, like man, living and conscious, a divine creature whose nature it reflected in human existence”.

This idea stresses the unity of all life and thought in the world. Many philosophers connect such an idea of microcosm with the idea of the World Soul, which, in this or that way, controls, or animates, particular (lesser) souls. The Orphic, Gnostic, Cabbalistic and Hermetic traditions made use of it, connecting it with mysticism, pantheism and the occult.

As already noted, this idea of microcosm was considered a hallmark of German philosophy, of what was called philosophia teutonica. Nicholas of Cusa, Jacob Böhme, Agrippa of Nettseheim, Paracelsus, Leibniz, Herbart, and later also Max Scheler, all accepted a kind of micro-cosmology which claims that the lesser worlds are controlled by the big world which, in turn, leads the life of the lesser worlds. Lotze’s project had a different focus and goal.

(2) Cosmos also means order in Greek. So microcosm can in addition signify “any part of a thing, especially a living thing, that reflects or represents the whole it belongs to, whenever there is a mirroring relation between the whole and each of its parts.” On this principle are built many sciences—and pseudo-sciences. I would like to remind the reader here of Astrology which claims that the fate of a person, in a period of time, is influenced by her co-relation to such macro-worlds as planets, stars, constellations, etc. In contemporary medicine such microcosmical relations are ubiquitous. Two examples: (a) in neurology, parts of the brain represent different parts of the body or its abilities (speech, orientation); (b) the main idea of acupuncture is that small parts of the surface of the human body are representatives of inner organs of the body.

(3) Finally, in Greek, cosmos means a unity, ordered according to certain principles. As we shall see in the lines to come, it is exactly in this sense that Lotze spoke of microcosm. He investigated how the microcosm of the human
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world—physiological, private, social—is ordered; and he discovered that it is ordered exactly like the macrocosm. With the purpose of elucidating this point further, I shall turn back to the history of Lotze’s Microcosm.

Before doing this, however, I must mention a puzzling moment in this work which quasi refutes our thesis. In the Conclusion to Volume One, Lotze speaks of microcosm in the following sense: “that perfect picture [vollkommenes Abbild] of the big reality, the lesser world, the microcosm.” In order to elucidate this place of Lotze’s Microcosm, I shall compare it with another one, in which the author specifies that the man is not a picture (Abbild) of nature, but rather a living point which receives innumerable perceptions from the world, not in order to reflect it in the same form, however, but in order to be stimulated from it according to her own disposition (Naturell).

The History of Lotze’s Microcosm-Project

The history of Lotze’s Microcosm is long and well-documented. Already in 1844, the author suggested to his editor, Hirzel, a book-project for an Anthropology and Natural History of Human Race—this in connection with a project for an encyclopedia of medicinal sciences. Soon, however, Lotze gave the idea up. His reason was that the theme of this project lies between medicine, philosophy, theology, and natural science, and so was an unfeasible task. Six years later, in 1850, Hirzel tried to persuade him to bring the project back to life, but Lotze refused. Surprisingly enough, during his visit to Göttingen in the winter of 1852–53, Hirzel convinced him to undertake it. Hirzel’s new idea was to end the book with a Chapter on the “Developing History of Human Culture”. Lotze agreed immediately and in a March 8, 1853 letter to Hirzel drew up a plan for his new book.

Lotze, however, needed much time in order to call it Microcosm. Indeed, the title Microcosm appeared first, in relation to this project, in his letter to Hirzel from October 2, 1854, where he also noted: “I am not sure it is [the title] silly, or rather good.” As a matter of fact, he embraced the metaphor of microcosm as a method for investigating in anthropology when writing the already mentioned Allgemeine Physiologie des körperliches Leben (1851) and Medicinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (1852). He realized that the analysis of microcosm in the light of the cosmos is logically much more strict than the deduction of the forms of life from the logical forms as accomplished by the speculative natural science of Hegel and Schelling. What was important to him was that the microcosm works according to the order of the macrocosm: they follow the same mechanism—not that we can make conclusions about the microcosm in analogy with the macrocosm, or vice versa.

This approach shows, with formal precision, the way the microcosm repeats the indefinite idea of the macrocosm. More to the point, it demonstrates that “if we understand the organism as a microcosm, then, according to Lotze, we can grasp the importance of life through a trait of its behavior, which must in fact express only a formal expediency of [it . . .], without necessarily determining or imagining its content.” This trait of its behavior was its mechanism or order.
Ontological Approach

In the section above we have already seen that central to Lotze’s *Microcosm* is order, the social order in particular. Here I would like to note that such an approach to examining society was embraced only in recent years. Its first champion was Eric Voegelin who created an extensive review (in five volumes) of human history from the point of view of different levels of order adopted in it. Quite recently, another author declared the concept of social order, together with that of social practices, central to social philosophy. This point suggests that Lotze’s *Microcosm* has a strong ontological stance in the sense that the book shows “a concern with ontological structure”. More precisely, in the book Lotze examined the development of human life according to the type of order, or ontological (geometrical) volume in which it is involved. Here is an example of this approach.

The savage changes passive, prolonged leisure with extremely intensive strain. In contrast, the settled peasant lives a rhythmic series of small portions of work and leisure. Her heart melts with the nearby landscape, making a home (*Heimat*) of it. She grows more patient as she gets accustomed to awaiting the reaping of the crop, following the four seasons, the rhythm of the nature. Such things teach the mind to feel involved in the consequential, but branched, lawfulness of nature.

Family life also changes the mind. In the family house; the person is isolated from outer perceptions and concentrates on intensive contact with family members. The walls of the house enclose a new realm of human imagination. A sequence of intertwined periods of joy, suffering, hope, and memories follows. In the wild life of savages, men and women accomplish their typical work separately: men go hunting, women stay home to bring up the children. Genders develop and manifest their true abilities, men’s power and women’s soul, only in their work together, in mutual complementation realized in more developed society.

Something similar can be said about the different generations. Indeed, whereas in the wild life, the new generation separates from the old immediately after physical maturity, the new generation of settled society often develops tasks and projects started by the old one. The result is interwoven souls, with common interests, but also with different characters and direction of imagination. This leads to conflicts of wishes, hopes, and fears, but also to spiritual enrichment. There is no surprise about this: the members of any family have a chorus of endlessly rich interests, only a small part of which comes to the surface of consciousness. The “drama of life”, however, would be colorless if the family remained at home. The family needs glances and evaluations from the outside; it needs the recognition of other families, of society.

Ecological Stance

Besides the ontological approach, the book also has specific ecological orientations. Indeed, we must not forget that Lotze planned his *Microcosm* as a super-
structure to Herder’s _Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit_ (1784/91), and to von Humboldt’s _Cosmos_ (1845/62), both written, at least in part, in geographic terms.

Here is an excerpt of Lotze’s ecology:

The shaping (Gestaltung) of the ground and the coloring of the sky immediately reflects on the temperament and the national imagination of the denizens of every country. On the other hand, all revolutions in human history had as a consequence a radical change in the life of the earth.”

Nevertheless, direct conclusions from cosmic to human life, or vice versa, are not reliable. You cannot infer the underdevelopment of the black race from the brightness of the sun in Africa, or the monotony of tropical life; or the fact that the black continent has too few inlets; or too small a number of navigable rivers, or just a few mountains. At the same time, Lotze underscores “how advantageous for the heart the simultaneous overview of huge spaces is; what a pleasure the ability to review a multiplicity of different objects in their reciprocal positions, as if embedded in a secure mesh of relations, is.” Geography influences spiritual dispositions (Naturell), not by what it is, influences is to reveal the mediating steps.

Concluding this section, I would like to note that the ecological approach in social philosophy has been explored in depth only in recent years. According to Barry Smith, the central concept of social philosophy is that of the niche in which the object fits. Another recent author is more concretely ecological. He defines human civilization “as a type of relationship, a relationship to the natural environment, re crafted by the civilizing impulse, to meet human demands”. The main thesis of this author is that all civilizations collapse because they have handled their environments so roughly as to have broken them.

**Theoretical Liberalism**

Lotze was against the hasty (apparent) satisfaction of our theoretical needs and expectations through one-sided theories. Instead, he introduced a method of discussing different views (Ansichten) on the subject under scrutiny. He even claimed that his final solutions were nothing but views which satisfy “needs of the heart”. That phrase had a sense of both a pathological finding and a critical standard. Incidentally, this point can be comfortably interpreted in the sense of Freud and Wittgenstein. Here I mean Wittgenstein’s claim that philosophical obsessions are similar to mental neuroses, which need therapy consisting in realizing the true use of language.

From here it follows that values are equipollent. Lotze treats every epoch of human culture as developed around a particular value: a) the Orient developed a taste for the colossal, b) the Jews for the elevated, c) the Greeks for the beautiful, d) the Romans for dignity and elegance, e) the Middle Ages for the fantastic and characteristic, and f) Modernity for the critical and inventive. These orientations and achievements are on a par with one another. Especially in political philosophy, the acceptance of the plurality of values was unique in German philosophy at the
The Kernel of the Project: Reciprocal Analysis

The declared objective of Lotze’s Microcosm was a “reflection on the meaning of our human being [Dasein]”. The urgency of this task was a consequence of the scientific and industrial revolution of the beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century. That revolution dramatically changed the way in which humans imagine the cosmos and universe. It eroded the unity of God and humanity. Traditional mythology proved inconsistent. As a consequence, the world started to seem alien, cold, immense. A substantial change in religious belief followed. Lotze saw danger in the numerous attempts (on the side of the mechanic philosopher–scientists like Georg Büchner, Heinrich Czolbe, Franz Fick, Jacob Moleschott and Karl Vogt) to prove that the microcosm of human beings is merely mechanical, or materialistic. His objective was to disprove such attempts and to make people feel at home in the world again. This objective motivated Lotze to articulate his conception “in completely popular form”.

Lotze’s first principle was mechanism, which claims that all processes and movements—physical, biological, psychical, bodily, social, ethical, cultural—are accomplished in a way that can be described mechanically. Further, mechanical processes are realized in interaction (Wechselwirkung). In a sense, mechanism and interaction are two sides of one thing—they always go together.

Accepting this principle, Lotze eschewed any reference to ‘deep’ explanations (such as vitalism in the philosophy of biology), interpretations, and other sorts of speculation. Here he meant above all Hegel’s intellectualism, which claimed that we can deduce facts of reality from general forms. In contrast, Lotze insisted that, when theorizing, we are obliged to recurrently refer to reality and to experiment. On this point, he was, without a doubt, influenced by his education as a medical doctor.

However, the mechanism is not the final solution in science—it is only its means. Moreover, mechanism contains in itself the indication of something higher. It can also be understood as the way in which purposes realize themselves in the world. On the theoretical side, mechanism is simply a method of research; it is not a fundamental explanation of life and mind. Indeed, our ideas of forces and natural laws of science do not say how the things in nature really function. To understand this, we must connect them with the realm of the trans-sensual (Übersinnliche). It is precisely the trans-sensual realm, the “higher and essential being”, which places us in a position to understand the processes in these mechanisms. Lotze himself called this conception ‘teleomechanism’. But what exactly does it mean?

Now, contrary to his contemporary anthropology, Lotze did not seek to explain man in terms of the devices which men produce. Rather, for him, the keys for understanding the human race are the results of human education and schooling (Bildung), as they were developed in history. This means that his philosophical
examination started backwards, from the history of culture, to logic and metaphysics. So its method was that of regression analysis.

So, it is from the history of culture that Lotze tried to understand how science, mathematics and logic function. More precisely, he believed that the main educational goods (Bildungsgüter), which cannot be substituted by science, are generally conveyed by poetry and religion. They supply a “higher perspective on the things”, or the “point of view of the heart”. This means that the mechanism which science explicates is not the only key to understanding the world; it is even not the most important key. Science became a science with a human face only as a unity and in connection with the historically developed values and forms of schooling and education.

But how exactly can the history of culture command the shape of logic, metaphysics and science? The answer is: through the ideal ethical value, logical validity, and aesthetic worth. Being identifiable magnitudes, these idealities serve as concepts of orientation. The spatial order is also such an ideality. Following Kant, Lotze claims that they pertain to the original mental reality, not to material reality. However, they need matter in order to be explicated. That explains why we do not have a priori notions of bad and good, as well as of blue and sweet. We understand them only in experience, as “secondary thoughts” (Nebengedanken). Further, in the same way, we derive from experience validities and values. It is and in our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. We find them further in ethics, aesthetics, science, mathematics, metaphysics and logic.

We must remember, however, that “the scientist can go after an worldview-philosophical orienting only when he reaches problems of foundations and bounds”. Up to this point, the mechanism is sine qua non for understanding the processes in the world. We must thus see the construction of the world (der Weltbau) only, and exclusively, in mechanical terms; there is no exception to this rule. At the same time, we must know that the meaning of this understanding is only secondary.

In this sense Lotze was convinced that the quarrel between materialism and idealism is quite superfluous. It is a quarrel about meaning: Idealists see too much meaning in reality, while materialists see no meaning in it at all. Lotze was convinced that aesthetics and religion (poetry and religious faith) are completely compatible with the calculationism of the materialists. All fears that the acceptance of the aesthetic elements in science and philosophy will make exact scientific concepts vague are in vain. On the other hand, the acceptance of the mechanism as a main principle cannot erode the comfort that we seek in philosophy—in particular, it does not invalidate the belief in free will, as many speculative philosophers believe it does. On the contrary. It only “increased the poetical appeal of the world” since it made the spiritual effort to achieve the trans-sensual more strenuous.
Lotze’s Anthropological Revolution in Philosophy

Lotze did not introduce anthropological investigation in philosophy. It was started in the sixteenth century, in an effort to renovate theology. During the next three centuries, anthropology became a favorite subject among German university philosophers—including Kant. In his anthropology, however, Lotze did not follow Kant. Indeed, already in his small Logic, he abolished Kant’s discrimination between theoretical and mundane philosophy. In fact, he developed his anthropology exactly in order to converge the two disciplines into one. Lotze made this the center of his interest in the concrete person, situated in a concrete environment.

More to the point, the main objective of the Microcosm was the investigation of the concrete man with her imaginings, dreams and feelings. Lotze considered these elements — as expressed in poetry and art — as constitutive to a human person and her life. This explains the central role that the concept of home (Heimat) plays in the ontology of the book. The related concept in its philosophy of mind is feeling, or heart (Gemüt), as different from mind (Geist) and soul (Seele).

Now, despite the fact that the concept of heart was introduced in the wake of German mysticism (of Meister Eckhart and Jacob Böhme), Lotze used it in a quite realistic sense. Heart is what makes us long for home. The longing is a result of our needs which we strive to satisfy. Life consists, above all, in consuming goods. This point of view on human life is, of course, close to hedonism.

We can conclude that the main objective of Lotze’s investigation was to reach a maximally true account of reality. It is no surprise, therefore, that Lotze’s Microcosm greatly influenced young philosophers of the time such as Wilhelm Dilthey. Indeed, on Christmas 1858, the latter (then 25) noted in his Notebook: “The second volume of Lotze’s Microcosm had really grasped me. This is a marvelous book.” Apparently, Lotze was attractive to Dilthey with his realism which puts stress on the individual and her concrete life. From this starting point, Dilthey developed his philosophy of life.

In this sense Lotze argued that Kant’s question “what can I know?” cannot be answered in isolation; it can be only answered in terms of concrete persons. Only when we embrace this perspective can we also grasp the depth and the importance of metaphysical problems. Lotze’s revolution in philosophy consists in the fact that he started to discuss metaphysics in an anthropological perspective; he thus made philosophy anthropological. This means that Lotze did not simply shift from metaphysics to anthropology. Rather, his anthropology became philosophy proper.

Part Two

In part two of my paper I shall review the major individual themes of Lotze’s Microcosm. My objective will be to demonstrate the way he treated specific problems in the book.
Language and Ethics

Starting with his small *Logic*, Lotze made enormous efforts to elaborate a convincing philosophy of language. His first step in this direction was to connect language with logic. In particular, he claimed that logic begins with exploring language forms. The reason for this assumption was that exactly the living, unconscious spirit of language throws a bridge between the immediate sensitivity and the logical and metaphysical definition of the forms. His next claim was that all forms of metaphysics exist through the forms of language.

Lotze criticized the understanding of language as picturing. Language does not make pictures of reality but is something of a method, of a rule for cognitive (mental) acting. In fact, the whole relation between microcosm and macrocosm is understood by Lotze in this intensive manner. The microcosm is quasi a language of the macrocosm, and at the same time, a place for understanding the possibilities of speaking about the macrocosm.

As a matter of fact, even the pictures by perceiving are not pictures proper. Be this as it may, the language of perceptions is our language as such. We use this language also for conveying truths of a higher order: truths of science, mathematics, logic, etc.

*Ethics*. Lotze’s predecessor at the Philosophy Chair in Göttingen, J F Herbart, embraced the explanatory style in philosophy. His starting point was the given: i.e., he opened his philosophical explorations with analysis of the appearances and of the objects of inner and outer experience which are given in immediate consciousness. The being was for Herbart real—beyond and independent from the world of ideas. From here followed a strict division between theoretical and practical philosophy—reality and values, being and ought, are independent one from another.

Lotze’s answer to Herbart was: it is true that we cannot make conclusions from being to ought; we, however, can make conclusions from ought to being. That is why, as he put it in his small *Metaphysics*, metaphysics starts from ethics. Of course, ethics is not presented in metaphysics in substantial form. Rather, it is a judgment about which possibilities of ordering of the relations between the things correspond to an ideally presupposed order. In this sense, there is no knowledge without presuppositions: “Every person, every generation poses questions not just to the being in its reality in itself, but in connection with the sense and value, in which the being confronts them through the life and history.”

This form of intuitivism explains why Lotze avoided Kant’s formalistic grounding of the categorical imperative. Instead, following Fries, he accepted a psychological basis of the maxims of ethics. He, more precisely, claimed that we draw our moral principles from the immediate certainty with which we consider something as true or good.
Soul and Body

According to Lotze, the soul is a scientific assumption; it is connected with the Principle of Explaining psychical phenomena which brings into being the ‘consciousness’ as a theoretical construction. This means that soul is not a substance. It appears as a substance only because of its connections to memory.

The way in which phenomena are explained in physics is not appropriate for the psychical world. Indeed, we cannot say why we feel the effects of the light-waves as color, or of the sound-waves as tones. In this sense Lotze criticized Herbart’s explanation of the interaction of ideas in mind with their strength. Such an account is borrowed from the physical conception of force. In truth, the content of ideas is more important than their intensity. For example, a faint noise can distract our attention from a loud din.

About the relation between soul and body, Lotze assumed a form of occasionalism. However, his occasionalism is rather practical—differing from the metaphysical version of Malebranche. This means that it is not a positive theory about the relation between body and soul—in fact, Lotze denies the possibility of its knowledge. His occasionalism is rather a methodological theory about how, despite this ignorance, we can gain the main concepts of the theory about the relation between body and soul which are necessary by investigating the composition of its elements. When taken in isolation, these elements are obscure and vague.

Lotze’s occasionalism anticipated the today widespread (especially in America) understanding of the psychical as a function of the physical. He further conceived this function as a form of interaction—in particular, as based on a causal connection which is the presupposition of all interactions.

In order to explain how matter is connected with mind, specifically by perceiving space and movement, Lotze introduced his famous conception of local-signs. What we directly see when perceiving a movement are only patches of color. What helps us to perceive the fact of movement is the strain which we make in order to perceive the movement. Lotze calls exactly this stimulus local sign. It is a means of transforming sense-perceptions into space-values. This transformation occurs as a conveying of signals, not of energy.

This means that for the connection of mind to matter it is not a fruit of reflection but of activity (in this assumption Lotze followed Kant again). Indeed, the process of space-perceiving is an activity of reconstruction of the external objects, and events, in consciousness. It is not simply a matter of grasping. Ostensibly, this conception was another blow against the purely mechanical understanding in philosophy.

Philosophy of Nature

As a young man Lotze was a close friend with Ernst Friedrich Apelt, a pupil of Jacob Friedrich Fries. Lotze even visited Fries in May or June 1840 in Jena. Soon he was made acquainted with Fries’ system which, similarly to that of Weiße, “became an occasion for productive criticism and, in this sense, was important to
Lotze”. Fries’ philosophy, to remind the reader, formally followed Kant, but in fact was even more “mechanical” and calculative than Herbart’s philosophy was. Lotze criticized him as too formal a philosopher who forgets the deep problems. However, if philosophy wants to be the spirit of its time, and she must be this, she cannot be based on formal schemes alone.

Specifically, Lotze criticized Fries’ (and Kant’s) dynamic understanding of matter. It conceives of the matter simply as an interplay of powers. In this way physical properties disappear. Against this understanding, Lotze embraced a form of atomism. Above all, atomism is important for the Principle of Individuation. Besides, Lotze was convinced that the order in the world cannot come into being from a purposeless and planless beginning—from an atomless gunk.

Lotze did not understand atoms as they were understood in antiquity: as last elements of reality which have different forms, but the same substance. “Atoms were thus [understood] not [as] simple elements, but [as] indivisible systems with many parts.” In contrast, he conceived of them as the logical atomists later have done: as the ultimate building blocks of the world which are idiosyncratic and remain unmodified in all compositions and divisions. Further, Lotze’s atoms were punctual (unräumlich), without extension. To be sure, extension is possible only where there are many points which can be easily identified and differentiated. The extensionless atoms find their mutual place in space through their powers. Through their resistance, they create the impression that they are impermeable and that they fill up the space.

The most important characteristic of the matter is the ability to suffer. Indeed, only if two essences mutually effect their respective sufferings can they be their respective interacting causes. At the same time Lotze was adamant that the concepts of suffering, effecting, and interaction are only—although inescapable—scientific metaphors. We must not conceive of them literally.

In questions of space, Lotze criticized his teacher Weiße again. Among other things, the latter made use of two categories: interaction (Wechselwirkung) and space, which he considered completely different. Lotze, in opposition, was convinced that the two coincide. For Weiße, the interaction is the condition of space. In contrast, Lotze differentiated, not between interaction and space, but between extension and place. ‘Extension’ refers to an infinite multiplicity of possible directions. Only the place makes these possibilities concrete, putting them into three coordinated directions.

We have already mentioned that following Kant, Lotze claimed that space and time (and also movement) are subjective forms of intuition; so these forms cannot be deduced from a third one. That is why the categories of space and time, together with the category of being, pertain to the beginning of philosophy. Space and time are thus pre-forms of the being, as well as instruments of thinking.

Zoology, Anthropology

We have already noted that Lotze’s problem in Microcosm was to fix man’s place in nature. His main principle was that we cannot prefer forms over facts—
Hegel had once done. Lotze also criticized Hegel’s ladder-model of natural history, which claimed that we can entail the value and importance of every species from its range on the ladder of evolution. Indeed, this claim is scarcely of any cognitive value.

Instead of formal ranging of living species, Lotze advances a comparison of their figures (Gestalten). More to the point, he classified animals not according to their capacity to think (as Herder did), but according to their physical performance and forms of consumption (genießen). “To know the man means, above all, to know his [her] destination [Bestimmung], the means which [s]he has in disposition to achieve it, as well as the hindrances that [s]he must overcome in this effort.”

In this kind of anthropology, the ability to use the arm, and later also instruments was most important in the history of man.

The most essential difference between man’s mind and that of animals is that men refer to their tradition: in language, science, technique, morals, as well as in practical habits and in judgments of everyday life. The very difference between the mind of animals and that of man arises not because of a difference in the elements which they contain; in fact, here and there the same mosaic-stones (Mosaikstifte) enter into the picture. Rather, that difference results from the way in which we combine them and use them.

Getting back to the tradition of the German Enlightenment in rehabilitating the importance of sensuality, of feelings, and imagination (Phantasie), in matters of pure anthropology, Lotze again criticized the intellectualism of the German Idealists. On this point he was criticized by many of his contemporaries, including his friends, the “speculative theists” I H Fichte and C H Weiße. These two found in the Microcosm too little idealism and too much realism.

**Social Progress**

Achieving progress is not a matter of finding a new order but of reaching a “systematic complete harmony” in this or that particular culture. It could be achieved, for example, if the rules of social conduct are transformed into a system of rights and duties of an objective spiritual organism. This society could be contemplated as a work of Nature, “or rather not simply of Nature, but of the Moral World Order [sittliche Weltordnung] which is independent of the individual.”

Lotze was not sure that the apparent progress of the human race made in the first half of the nineteenth century really meant an increase of humanity in society. It is true that today we understand nature much better than one thousand years ago. This, however, is mainly due to the fact that the professional work which men now perform requires new kinds of plans and so makes people sensitive to the value of success (Gelingen). The progress itself is connected to the following specific characteristic of humans: they have absolutely no envy of future generations and are even ready to sacrifice themselves for them.

It is true that such progress increased the power of man over nature. But it is questionable whether this was profitable for human life. The point is that parallel
to the extended domination over nature, man also became increasingly dependent on it. Above all, the new way of life created new consumption needs. Perhaps many new needs are superfluous; they, however, cannot be eliminated through mere insight into this truth. The disapproving stance on this matter, taken by Rousseau or Diogenes of Sinop, is attractive and plausible only as a critique, not per se. Indeed, the natural state, which they propagated, can be seen as a state of innocence, but also one of barbarism.

As a solution to this conundrum Lotze accepts that there is a constant human way of life which repeats itself practically unchanged—with purposes, motives and habits of the same form. This is the course of the world (der Weltlauf), the same always-green shoot from which colorful blossoms of history shoot up all the time in cycles. The true goods of our inner life increase either only slowly, or perhaps they do not increase at all.

Of course, we are inclined to think that there is one direction of progress which leads to final ends. This, however, is not necessarily the case. It is true that the “higher world” is now more clear to us than five centuries ago. However, the strength with which the heart clings to it remains the same. Lotze’s objective is to find out—in the nature of human heart and mind—the available means with whose help Providence works in history.

The most interesting characteristic of our time is the division of work and the (protestant) phenomenon of profession. An important effect of this development is that life is now divided into work and leisure. Unfortunately, leisure is now shorter than man had once hoped it would be. This makes the man of today doubt whether his official life is the true life.

Every profession stimulates the heart to embody a peculiar temperament, specific direction of imagination, a perspective on the world, a way of judging, specific habitus. Of course, the monotony of professional life has its disadvantages. Nevertheless, the colorfulness of different ways of existence (Existenzarten) makes modernity one of the most interesting epochs of human history.

**Philosophy of History**

A central subject of *Microcosm* is the history of man and society. What is the sense of human history? Lotze is inclined to see history in a spiral development. Many achievements of society disappear without a trace; these, or something similar to them, are reintroduced by new societies. That point reveals Lotze’s perspective on history as rather gloomy—a contraposition to the glorious picture of history, delivered by the mainstream historians of the time.

In particular, Lotze criticized modern rationalism in history (of Leopold von Ranke and Johann Gustav Droysen) which overestimated both facts and forms. Instead, he praised the poetic approach to history. Indeed, poetry and history have much in common: above all, they are both creative. The danger of a joint approach of this kind is the inclination to accept that the events of history are effects of ideas.

The ideas of history are to be conceived, not in their meaning for today, but exactly as they were embraced, felt, and consumed in the past. The historian
must find out how the problem was seen by concrete agents, in different times, and at different geographic sites. By the way, this understanding of history proved a threat to Lotze’s *Microcosm*-project: he soon found out that the part of the book which treated history could fill several volumes. Faced with this problem, Lotze decided to end the book, practically, unfinished.

Further, mainstream history speaks about heroes and their actions, but is silent about the means helping these actions came through into life. She is silent about the inner changes of heart, the world view, the joys, and consumption of life on the side of the agents. Even poetry leaves many uncovered gaps in the description of the quotidian hustle and bustle. Paradoxically, stories of the distant past appear more plausible if they are drawn up through a few leading features. We are inclined to think that in the past people’s words were only carved in stone, were motionless formations (*Gestalten*), etc.

Lotze discussed two conceptions of history in more specific terms:

1. Lessing’s thesis that the purpose of history is the education of humanity. This conception is not that bad since Lotze too was convinced that the purpose of human spiritual life consists in the richness of harmonic education. Besides, it considers education as concerned with the concrete, living person.

2. Hegel’s thesis that history is a development of the idea of humanity; every development is a realization of this idea. All things which do not conform to this idea are declared superficial.

The first problem with Hegel’s thesis is that no one can say where humanity, or the world-spirit (*Weltgeist*), is. The second, even more serious problem is that this conception neglects the individual life of persons. Further, it neglects women and writes history of the male society only. Besides, a big part of humanity leads an a-historic life. This fact is totally neglected by Hegel and his friends. Thirdly, Lotze criticized Hegel’s claim that the world-spirit can lead the agents of history unconsciously. This is a form of mysticism which disagrees with the spirit of scientific philosophy that Lotze respected most.

### Political Philosophy

In Chapter 5 of Book 8, “The Public Life and Society”, Lotze discussed social rationalization, power, bureaucracy, national values, sovereignty, and international relations. Above all, he defended the enlightened, hereditary monarchy. Indeed, under present conditions it offers “the greatest security for steady development”—and that is what is important in political life. Further, being a proponent of the concrete man, with his feelings and imagination, Lotze defended paternal patriotism. He preferred the love for the fatherland over the love for the state. Lotze criticized the view that the State itself should exist for its own sake alone. He also distrusted parliamentary representation and party politics.

Lotze repudiated Plato’s model of the state in the form of a human body and accepted instead the political equilibrium achieved as “the result of the reciprocal action of unequal forces.” In matters of international law, he, the defender of plural values, was a proponent of a cosmopolitan balance of sovereign states:
“The increasing relations between the different divisions of humankind changed in great measure the significance of the political boundaries and gave new stimulus to the idea of cosmopolitanism.”

Lotze disparaged those critics of modernity who claimed that its proponents only defend their desire for material well-being. Further, he adhered to the principles of the classical bourgeois liberalism but criticized the “Manchester liberalism” in what today is called the paradox of liberalism: Liberalism (Lotze did not use the term) fails to show how an isolated human being can be a subject of rights. Indeed, right is a reciprocal, and so collective, concept: “one’s right is what the others feel for us as a duty”.

Lotze criticized the concept of natural law of the mainstream Western philosophers and had sympathies with the historicist conception of law of Leopold von Ranke and Friedrich von Savigny. He used to say that “the beginning of all legitimacy is illegitimate, although it need not be at the same time illegal.”

**Philosophy of Religion**

Religion was for Lotze a form of feeling of life (Lebensgefühl) in which the awareness of the fragility of the human race is connected with a conscience about a lay profession. Men know how modest their life-tasks are and nevertheless are happy to pursue them. This is a belief which follows the consciousness and the inner voice, and which, nevertheless, is exactly as certain as the knowledge we receive through the senses.

Lotze criticizes the claim of the Enlightenment (e.g., of Hegel) that religion is only a product of human reason. If that was the case, then it would be possible to replace religion with philosophy. In truth, however, reason alone is not enough to grasp religious truth: we learn it through revelation which can be thought of as the historical action of God. Lotze also criticizes Fries who compared religion, which starts from unproven truths, to science which is also ultimately based on unproved axioms we believe. Indeed, whereas the axioms of science are general and hypothetical judgments, the propositions of religion are assertoric.

Historically, the world-religions started in the Orient, where the world (die Welt) was seen as a whole for the first time: it develops according to general laws. In the beginning, the Occident accepted this belief. Soon, however, it started to consider the world as something unfinished, giving opportunities to the individuals to form it according to the specific purposes of everyone. The future was seen as formless, so that human action can change reality in an absolutely new way. Embracing this view, the believers abandoned quietism and embraced vita activa. Reducing the horizons of human imagination to the practical tasks of the earthly world, the need to connect it with the transcendental waned. The result was the belief in progress and a turn away from God. From now on Godhood was considered mainly in moral terms. The dogma and the cult waned.

Pagans, in their most developed form of antiquity, believed in reason, in self-respect, and in the sublime. Lotze called this stance “a heroism of the pure reason”. In the pagan mind, nature plays a central role. Unfortunately, pagans
failed to foster humaneness. This was the historical achievement of Christianity: a totally new understanding of the moral duties. Of course, pagans recognized moral duties too. However, they understood them as having the same necessity as natural laws have. In contrast, Christianity—especially Protestantism—taught its believers to carry out duties following their personal conscience. Because it established this immediate connection to God, Christianity made it possible for individual Christians to pursue their own values of preference. These are independent from the provenance of the individual and from her actual place in the society. In this way, the respect for persons’ dignity was secured.

It is beyond doubt that, historically, Christianity realized the best schooling (Bildung) ever. Christianity, however, is not only a teaching. It requires a faithfulness to the historical process realized through revelation. That is why Christian dogmatics must be preserved and cultivated. Of course, in the holy scriptures there are many ambiguities. These, however, result from the fact that the people of past times, when these scriptures were written down, had different notions about the world, law, and order than we today have.

We must look upon Christian dogmatics as putting questions about the purpose of human life, not as giving answers. Lotze was confident that every new generation would return to these questions. Of course, dogmatics can be criticized: indeed, the critical Protestant theology was, historically, the best way to interpret God. But we must not cast Christian dogmatics away as obsolete.

A main idea of Lotze’s *metaphysics of religion* was that “all the processes in nature are only understandable through the continual involvement of God; only this involvement arranges the transition of the interaction [Übergang des Wechselwirkungs] between different parts of the world”.

Apparently, Lotze’s concept of God is a religious expression of the concept of metaphysical substance. God is the foundation of reality; not in the sense of pantheism, however, but in the sense of creative power which is unthinkable without a living personality with its will—the person of God.

The reason for this is that Lotze’s starting point in philosophy—the concept of humanity—does not have a generic character; we can grasp it only in terms of particular individuals, or persons. This means that the person is the highest concept of the mind. The consequent carrying out of this concept leads to a full-fledged concept of God–person. God is something of an ideal of persons, their standard. We cannot prove Him, but we must believe in Him.

**Epilogue**

In the lines above I have tried to outline the main ideas of Hermann Lotze’s *Microcosm* as they can be of interest to the reader of today. I found that this work is most illuminating to the correct understanding of Lotze’s development as a philosopher. It worked out in detail some theses already formulated in his earlier works, *Metaphysics* (1841) and *Logic* (1843), but in rudimentary and rough form. In the *Microcosm* Lotze thus made them sophisticated enough that he could use
them with elegance and precision in his *System of Philosophy* (1874/9). In particular, the author elaborated the inner connection between philosophical logic and anthropology, logicizing in this way, many intimate problems of the human soul, mind, and action. His convoluted and intensive program was filled with so many ideas that it could give inspiration to the leading world-philosophies of the twentieth century: (1) Analytic Philosophy; (2) Phenomenology; (3) Pragmatism; (4) Hermeneutics; and the (5) Philosophy of Life.115

**References**


Humboldt A (1845/62), Kosmos (5 vols) Cotta, Stuttgart.

Husserl E (1895/7) Lotze—Microcosmos, Manuscript KI 59 of the Husserl Archives at the University of Louvain, Belgium, transcription by R Parpan, 42 pages.


Notes

1 The book’s subtitle is: Ideas towards a Natural History of Humanity: Essay on Anthropology.
2 Schmidt 1923, pp vii–viii.
3 For an alternative guess see Stambovsky 2003.
4 For Lotze’s influence on the early analytic philosophers see Milkov 2000; for his influence on Husserl see Hauser 2003. By the way, Husserl prepared an extensive manuscript on Lotze’s Microcosm, which he intended to include as an Appendix to his Logical Investigations (see Husserl 1895/7) Unfortunately, this manuscript is still unpublished.
5 What these other things are we shall see in §§ 9 and 10.
6 Lotze 1858, pp 381–89. Here, and in what follows, Lotze’s Microcosm is quoted according to his sixth edition (Lotze 1923).
7 Max Scheler has called it “a classical monument of the philosophical literature” (see Scheler 1997, p 133).
8 All three works were published as contributions to R Wagner, Handwörterbuch der Physiologie mit Rücksicht auf die physiologische Pathologie, 4 volumes (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1842/53).
9 Levy 1976, p 122.
10 Ibid.
11 Lotze 1856a, p 452.
12 Lotze 1923, p 362. See also § 11, paragraph 2.
13 For a detailed discussion see Pester 1997, pp 201–02.
14 Lotze 2003, pp 229–30. On the formal side, Lotze accepted this project “since it requires multifarious reflections, and this is very good for someone like me who is habituated to more abstract range of thoughts” (p 230). Apparently, Lotze sought a change in the style of this work—and this change was fruitful indeed.
15 Ibid, p 257.
16 Pester 1997, p 150.
17 Ibid, p 204; pp 151f.
18 Voegelin 1956/87.
20 Smith 1994, p 3. This, according to Barry Smith, is one of the characteristics of Austrian philosophy. This is not a surprise if we keep in mind that Austrian philosophy, or the School of Franz Brentano, was massively influenced by Lotze.
21 Lotze 1923, p 428.
22 Ibid, p 429.
23 Incidentally, this point of Microcosm, repeated in Lotze’s later works, made him interesting to the psychoanalysts. Sandor Ferenczi, for example, found out that in his Psychology (Lotze 1881), Lotze formulated, in a theoretical way, propositions which “manifest such an agreement with the psychological conception of psychoanalysis, reached in an empirical way, that we can consider their author as one of the forerunners of Freud’s ideas.” (Ferenczi 1913, p 238)
25 Lotze 1923, p 349.
26 Ibid, p 353.
Ibid, p 356.
Smith 1998.
Lotze’s examination of the relation between men and women, discussed in § 2, shows the same theoretical attitude.
Lotze 1864, Book 7, Chapter 5.
“The Jews are like a parasitic plant, which attached itself to almost all European nations, and more or less drew from their juice”. Herder 1784/91, p 437.
Lotze 1856b, p 304.
Ibid, p 308.
It deserves notice that Lotze was critical to speculations in philosophy in exactly the same sense GE Moore and Bertrand Russell were at the beginning of the 20th century.
Lotze 1864, p 241.
In this sense Microcosm was a philosophy of history. It, however, is not to be confused with the historical theory of the time (of Leopold von Ranke, Johann Gustav Droysen) which Lotze severely criticized. See on this § 16. Ibid, pp 310–11.
Ueberweg 1916, p 272.
Lotze 1856b, p 306.
Ibid, p 305.
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See 1874, § 208; 1879, pp 179 f; Misch 1912, p xciv; Lehmann 1931, p 144.
Lotze 1864, p 241.
Pester 1997, p 219. This point was followed by both Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein in their discovery of the region of silence beyond the foundations of calculative logic.
Lotze 1856b, p 310.
Ibid, p 306.
Lotze criticized the division between “speculative knowledge” and “general bourgeois knowledge” already in his small Metaphysics. (1841a, p 17)
It is curious that in his review of Microcosm, Lotze’s teacher, Christian Weiße, ignored Lotze’s use of heart (Gemüt) and instead spoke of mind (Geist). (see Weiße 1865, passim) This fact shows how unusual the use of this concept was at the time.
See Lasslop 1974.
To this purpose he also introduced, and widely used, the concept of coloring: “An immense color intensity of our lively, concrete world examination grants an endless occupation” (Lotze 1923, p 383). Today we connect the concept of coloring mainly with Frege who, apparently, borrowed it from Lotze.
Quotation according to Pester 1997, p 255.
On the joint program for new, concrete philosophy of Lotze and Dilthey, see Orth 1984a, 1984b.
Cf. with a similar conception, but developed in completely different key, of Karl Marx, who was only one year younger than Lotze.
Orth 1986, p 43.
Lotze 1843, p 40.
Ibid, p 82. Cf. with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 3.1: “In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses”.

27 Ibid, p 356.
31 Lotze’s examination of the relation between men and women, discussed in § 2, shows the same theoretical attitude.
32 Lotze 1864, Book 7, Chapter 5.
33 “The Jews are like a parasitic plant, which attached itself to almost all European nations, and more or less drew from their juice”. Herder 1784/91, p 437.
34 Lotze 1856b, p 304.
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37 Ueberweg 1916, p 272.
38 Lotze 1856b, p 306.
39 Ibid, p 305.
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41 See 1874, § 208; 1879, pp 179 f; Misch 1912, p xciv; Lehmann 1931, p 144.
42 Lotze 1864, p 241.
43 Pester 1997, p 219. This point was followed by both Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein in their discovery of the region of silence beyond the foundations of calculative logic.
44 The idea that we can understand the world only if we understand its construction was embraced by Bertrand Russell and Rudolf Carnap. See Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1914); Rudolf Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt (Berlin: Weltkreis, 1928).
45 Lotze 1856b, p 310.
46 Ibid, p 306.
47 Lotze criticized the division between “speculative knowledge” and “general bourgeois knowledge” already in his small Metaphysics. (1841a, p 17)
48 It is curious that in his review of Microcosm, Lotze’s teacher, Christian Weiße, ignored Lotze’s use of heart (Gemüt) and instead spoke of mind (Geist). (see Weiße 1865, passim) This fact shows how unusual the use of this concept was at the time.
49 See Lasslop 1974.
50 To this purpose he also introduced, and widely used, the concept of coloring: “An immense color intensity of our lively, concrete world examination grants an endless occupation” (Lotze 1923, p 383). Today we connect the concept of coloring mainly with Frege who, apparently, borrowed it from Lotze.
51 Quotation according to Pester 1997, p 255.
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53 Cf. with a similar conception, but developed in completely different key, of Karl Marx, who was only one year younger than Lotze.
54 Orth 1986, p 43.
55 Lotze 1843, p 40.
56 Ibid, p 82. Cf. with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 3.1: “In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses”.

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Lotze, 1856a, p 304. Cf. with Strawson’s claim from his *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959) that the material bodies, identified in space and time, are the basic individuals; every other individual can be identified referring to them.

The German Idealists refused to see the world as given. For them, it was a problem.

Pester, p 119.

*Ibid*, p 133.


Lotze 1923, p 287.

Cf. with Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of the uncritical use of physical concepts in psychology as developed in his *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1949).

Lotze 1856a, pp 238 f.

Lotze 1852, pp 77 f.

Lotze 1856a, pp 328 f. Cf with Bertrand Russell’s conception of external objects as “logical constructions” developed in *Our Knowledge of the External World*.

Pester 1997, p 42. “[Lotze] drew important concepts of maxims, values and even rational induction from Fries” (Woodward 1996, p 5).


Fichte and Schelling were also against accepting atoms into the philosophy of nature. Kant himself was not so clear on this point. In *Monadologia physica* (1756) he said that monads are not in space, rather, they fill the space. But in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (especially in its second edition) Kant was more atomistic.

Lotze 1856a, p 39.

Here and in the next paragraph we see examples of how Lotze used microcosmic metaphors in the world of cosmos. *Ibid*, p 402.

A concept widely used by Lotze’s fellow countryman Jacob Böhme (both come from Upper Lusatia (Oberlausitz)), more than two centuries before him, in his *Aurora oder Morgenröte im Aufgang*, Dresden, 1634.

Lotze 1864, p 574.

This point of Lotze’s reminds us of Wittgenstein’s claim that even his similes, with the help of which we tried to abolish philosophical illusions, are misleading (TS 213, p 418). Wittgenstein came to this conclusion in the second half of the 1930s when he realized that his conception of language as a calculus, that he held in the early 1930s, is misleading.


See Pester 1997, p 110.

See Lotze 1841b, pp 103 f.

This theme is central in Max Scheler, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (Darmstadt: Reichl, 1928).

Lotze 1923, p 72.

On this point Lotze was close to philosophers of the Enlightenment like Benjamin Franklin.

Lotze 1923, p 262.


Lotze 1923, p 266.

See Weiß 1865, pp 289 f.

Lotze 1923, p 424.

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89 See how Lotze’s discussion relates to burning issues today.
90 Lotze 1923, p 345.
91 Ibid, p 346.
92 Lotze 1864, p 281, pp 245–47. It is astonishing how close these lines are, written by Lotze 150 years ago, to the conditio humana of today. The problem was discussed, for example, in Robert Nozick, The examined life: philosophical meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
93 Lotze 1923, pp 437–38.
96 Lotze 1923, p 343.
97 Ibid, p 344.
98 This stance was developed in the 1920s, and later, by Marc Bloch and his friends from Annalen.
99 Lotze 1864, pp 47 ff. On this point Lotze appears as a predecessor of the feminism of today. One author had recently noted that “[t]he book [Microcosm] probably had following among educated women”. In support of this surmise he also referred to the fact that it was translated into English by two women: Elizabeth Hamilton and EE Constance Jones. (Woodward 1996, p 17).
100 Lotze 1864, p 444.
101 In this way he quasi opposed to the today fashionable principle of “constitutional patriotism” (of Jürgen Habermas).
102 Lotze 1864, p 423.
103 Ibid, p 436.
104 Ibid, p 427.
106 Lotze 1923, pp 447 ff.
107 Lotze 1864, p 546.
109 Many of Lotze’s contemporaries, say Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), claimed that Christianity is nothing but a moral teaching. We can discover similar claims also by Kant.
110 In this Lotze was followed by his contemporary Albrecht Ritschl who was against the conservative-Lutheran and confessional theology of the time. Ritschl criticized both Luther and Melanchthon, who made concessions to the dogmas of the church, losing in this way the moral essence of Christianity. His theology, however, also opposed rationalism and was for a “positive evangelical teaching”. Above all, it rehabilitated the old idea of the Kingdom of God, putting it at the center of theology (see Neugebauer 2002, p 27). Ritschel believed that, reformed this way, theology would be made to correspond to the spiritual needs of modernity.
111 Lotze 1864, p 364.
112 See Pester 1997, p 335. By the way, “Lotze’s endeavour to lead all things back, in their interaction, to an underlying community of entities, which, in its turn, is based on an
infinite mental and personal substance, was defined as teleological monism.” (Kettern 1993, p 272).

\[133\] Lotze 1864, pp 587 ff.

\[134\] Ibid, p 52.

\[135\] For his helpful comments on the material contained in an early draft of this paper, I would like to thank Reinhard Pester.